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Abstract 
Recipient country ownership has been seen by many aid experts, to be an important 
way to improve the effectiveness of aid delivery.  Technical assistance projects 
consume 25% of worldwide ODA,1 and have been criticised by many aid experts for 
being ineffective.  
The Solomon Islands Government (SIG) has received a large amount of technical 
assistance over the last ten years and therefore makes it a useful government to use 
as a case study to answer the main question of this thesis: Is the transfer of 
ownership in technical assistance projects shifting from the donor to the SIG? 
The research has found that the SIG has more ownership of their technical 
assistance projects at the management level than at the operational level.  The main 
constraints to SIG having more ownership at the management level were in the 
areas of technical advisor (TA) recruitment and performance management 
processes, and some areas of aid funding. 
At the operational level of technical assistance projects, the amount of SIG 
ownership was significantly less.  Many of the restraints in the transfer of ownership 
to the SIG counterparts were at the individual TA level, and were largely related to 
poor working relationships between individual TAs and counterparts caused by 
shortcomings in TAs’ capacity building and people management skills and TAs’ lack 
of knowledge of the SIG working style and environment.   
More ownership needs to be transferred at the operational level for the SIG to have 
‘real’ ownership of their technical assistance projects. 
  
                                                          
1 OECD, Perspective Note: Technical Co-operation for Capacity Development, OECD, (2011), pg 4. 
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Introduction 
The most effective way to implement development aid has long been disputed.  
Since the beginning of modern aid in the 1940’s, development aid organisations 
have taken different approaches to improve the effectiveness of aid delivery.  
Since the 1990s, there has been a renewed effort towards promoting recipient 
country ‘ownership’2 of aid projects. 
Transferring ownership to the recipient country can help address aid effectiveness 
issues raised by aid experts.  Allowing recipient countries to have more ownership 
over their development aid, and letting them choose the types of projects they 
need, helps ensure recipient country buy-in and commitment, which ultimately can 
improve the likelihood of success and the sustainability of a project.  If recipient 
countries had more ownership of aid projects, it would help dispel concerns about 
donor driven aid projects that address the needs of the donors rather than the 
needs of the recipient country. 
Allowing recipient countries to have more ownership in the implementation of their 
aid projects would also improve the effectiveness of aid programmes.  If recipient 
governments could make their own decisions regarding procurement of aid goods 
and services, it could address issues around tying of aid and of employing aid 
professionals that have the wrong skill set or lack of local knowledge.   
During the 1990s, in recognition of recipient country ownership, some donors 
began to implement budget support type funding models.  These models directed 
aid funding into the recipient governments’ finances, which gave the recipient 
countries more control and ownership of their aid funding.   In 1999 the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank initiated the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in recognition that poor countries need to 
have ownership of their development reform programmes.3  Ownership is also a 
key principle in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that was ratified in 2005 
by over 100 developed and developing countries.4 
                                                          
2 For an explanation of what ‘ownership’ means in terms of this thesis, refer to section 2.2. 
3 https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
4 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827300.pdf (last accessed 11th January 2015). 
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A 2011 World Bank report reiterates the importance of recipient country ownership 
by stating: ‘Country ownership has become probably the most prevalent and 
widely held principle in development assistance in recent years, reflecting the 
growing recognition that donor-driven development assistance and technical 
solutions imported from other countries were often ineffective in bringing about 
sustained change.’5 
With more and more donors appreciating the need to transfer ownership of aid 
projects to recipient countries, changes to projects have been put in place and a 
level of commitment has been made by donors to transfer ownership to recipient 
countries.  So has ownership in aid projects shifted from the donor to the recipient 
country?   
The main purpose of this thesis is to assess whether ownership has transferred 
from the donor to the recipient country in the field, rather than just in the 
headquarters of donor organisations.  The research focuses on technical 
assistance projects that are carried out in the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) 
to assess whether ownership is transferring from donors to the SIG.   
The research has focused on technical assistance projects as they make up such 
a large proportion of worldwide Official Development Assistance (ODA): technical 
assistance projects consume 25% of all ODA.6  The research has also focused on 
technical assistance as aid experts have widely criticised technical assistance 
projects for being ineffective.  With such a significant amount of aid money being 
spent on technical assistance, this is an important area to research. 
The SIG has received a considerable amount of technical assistance, especially 
since the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) intervention 
into the Solomon Islands ‘ethnic tensions’ in 2003.  As the SIG has had such a 
large number of technical assistance projects, it is a suitable government to use 
for this research. 
This research concentrates on technical assistance projects where a technical 
advisor (TA) is contracted by a donor to work alongside a SIG public servant, 
                                                          
5 Nicola Smithers, The Importance of Stakeholder Ownership for Capacity Development Results, World Bank 
Institute, Washington, (2011), pg 8. 
6 OECD, Perspective Note: Technical Co-operation for Capacity Development, OECD, (2011), pg 4. 
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known as a counterpart, to help build the counterpart’s capacity to be more 
effective and efficient in his or her government role, and to help build the capacity 
of the counterpart’s government department. 
The TA role is quite different from other training or capacity building roles we see 
in developed countries.  Technical advisors can spend one to two years working 
alongside their counterpart on a daily basis.  It is hard to image any developed 
country’s government approaching capacity building of staff in the same way.  The 
TA role, therefore creates its own set of unique challenges.  
Chapter one reviews the history of modern aid and the different methods that 
donors have employed over time in their aid delivery.  The chapter demonstrates 
how ‘ownership’ has moved in and out of favour with donors over the years, and 
how today donors view ownership as a key factor in improving the quality of aid 
delivery.   
Chapter one also highlights some aid effectiveness issues that have been 
identified in aid development literature, and discusses how recipient country 
ownership of aid programmes can help address some of those issues.   
Chapter two describes what technical assistance projects are and what technical 
advisors do.  It explains how technical assistance projects are often about training 
staff and bringing in changes, and the importance of ownership in both workplace 
training and in change management.   
Chapter two also discusses the importance of ownership at the operational level of 
technical assistance projects.  For example, if recipient countries have ownership 
at the programme country level, but have little ownership at the operational level, 
then there will be little buy-in or commitment at the level where the capacity 
building or changes are being implemented. 
The chapter highlights many criticisms relating to the effectiveness of technical 
assistance projects and discusses issues related to technical assistance projects, 
which it shows often relate to the same issues of aid effectiveness as identified in 
chapter one.  Accordingly, the chapter shows that many issues in technical 
assistance projects can also be addressed by giving the recipient country more 
ownership of their technical assistance projects.   
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Chapter three gives a brief overview of the Solomon Islands.  This chapter also 
summarises the Australian led RAMSI intervention, which included a large number 
of capacity building technical assistance projects.  The chapter reviews existing 
RAMSI evaluation reports and looks at issues RAMSI had in their technical 
assistance projects in the Solomon Islands. 
Chapter four discusses the research that was undertaken in the Solomon Islands 
to assess whether ownership in technical assistance programmes is shifting from 
the donors to the SIG.  The research had two different perspectives: the 
management perspective and the operational perspective.  The research included 
semi-structured interviews with SIG managers, donor representatives, TAs and 
SIG counterparts. 
The standard questions asked of interviewees were derived from ownership 
principles, technical assistance project issues identified in aid literature, and 
existing donor reports on technical assistance projects in the Solomon Islands.   
Often donor reports on technical assistance projects review their progress, 
highlighting what is working and what is not.  This research considers a different 
aspect of technical assistance projects and focuses on whether ownership of the 
projects is shifting to the recipient country.  
International donors and development organisations reviews on ‘ownership’ are 
often at the broader country level, such as reviews of the Paris Declaration, whose 
main ownership focus is on recipient countries developing their own National 
Development Strategies (NDS).  There are fewer reviews of ‘ownership’ at the 
operational level, for example, where technical assistance is being carried out.  
This research assesses not only how much ownership SIG managers and donors 
have in technical assistance projects in the Solomon Islands, but it goes one level 
deeper and assesses how much ownership the SIG counterparts & TAs have. 
The research found that SIG ownership of technical assistance projects was 
increasing at the management level.  The main areas where more ownership 
could be transferred to the SIG were in the TA recruitment and TA performance 
management areas.  More ownership could also be transferred in some areas of 
aid funding. 
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At the operational level of technical assistance projects, the amount of SIG 
ownership was significantly less than at the management level.  Many of the 
restraints in the transfer of ownership to the SIG counterparts were at the 
individual TA level.  Many TAs did not build strong relationships and encourage 
their SIG counterparts to take ownership of both their individual and organisational 
capacity building.  This was largely due to the TAs lack of people management 
and capacity building skills, as well as inappropriate working styles.  Solomon 
Island Government counterparts also had little involvement in the recruitment and 
performance management of the TAs they worked with. 
More ownership needs to be transferred at the operational level for the SIG to 
have any ‘real’ ownership of their technical assistance projects. 
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Chapter One – Aid Effectiveness and Ownership 
This chapter reviews the history of modern aid and the different methods that 
donors have employed over time in their aid delivery.  The chapter reveals how 
recipient country ownership has once again become a high priority of donors in 
attempts to improve aid effectiveness.  The chapter also looks at aid effectiveness 
issues and how recipient country ownership can help address them. 
1.1 Concise History of Modern Aid Delivery 
The modern era of international aid can be traced back to the 1940s and the end 
of World War II.  In 1948 the United States (US) President Harry Truman along 
with his Secretary of State George Marshall implemented the Marshall Plan to 
assist with the reconstruction of war ravaged Europe.7  The Marshall Plan was 
seen as a way to calm fears of global stagnation, to prevent developing countries 
falling to communism, to bring economic progress to poor countries and to access 
untapped markets of poor economies.8  It was seen as a win-win scenario for all 
concerned.9 
In 1949 Truman gave the first speech by a national leader expressing why 
governments needed to provide aid to develop poor countries.10  He stated: 
‘More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching 
misery.  Their food is inadequate.  They are victims of disease. Their 
economic life is primitive and stagnant.  Their poverty is a handicap and a 
threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.  For the first time in 
history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering 
of these people’.11 
In 1948 the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was 
established to run the Marshal Plan.12  In 1961 the OEEC evolved into the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).13  During the 
                                                          
7 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press, UK, (2008), pg 24. 
8 Damien Kingsbury, Joe Remenyi, John McKay & Janet Hunt, Key Issues in Development, Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York, (2004), pg 27. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press, UK, (2008), pg 24. 
11 Stephen Browne, Aid & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? Earthscan, UK & USA, (2006), pg 15. 
12 http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
13 Ibid. 
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1940s the World Bank and the IMF were established to help address economic 
and social issues.14  The United Nations was created in 1945.  It took over from 
the former League of Nations,15 with the purpose of working towards world peace 
and development.16   Some of the international non-government organisations 
(INGO) were also founded during the 1940s, such as OXFAM and CARE17 with 
similar objectives.  Other INGOs already established included the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) established in 186318 and Save the Children 
established in 1919.19  By the end of the 1940’s most of the major organisations 
that are involved in development aid today were established. 
Between 1950 and 1990 development aid was heavily influenced by the Cold War.  
McKay writes ‘During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union saw aid and 
development programmes as a major weapon in the battle to gain support for their 
ideologies and systems’.20  This influenced donors’ choice of which countries they 
worked with. The end of the Cold War, some say, saw the end of ‘political aid’ and 
along with it there was a significant drop in world aid, commonly known as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA).21   The reduced level of ODA was also linked to 
large fiscal deficits of donor countries and concerns about the environment into 
which aid funds were being directed.22 
During the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, development took a ‘do as we did’ 
approach.23  It was believed that developed countries had advanced because of 
sufficient capital, export earnings and skills, therefore that was what developing 
countries should be provided as aid: investible funds, balance of payments support 
and technical assistance.24   
                                                          
14 Damien Kingsbury, Joe Remenyi, John McKay & Janet Hunt, Key Issues in Development, Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York, (2004), pg 47. 
15http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006AC19C/(httpPages)/242056AEA671DEF780256EF30037A2A8?OpenDoc
ument (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
16 http://www.un.org/pubs/cyberschoolbus/unintro/unintro.asp (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
17 Stephen Browne, Aid & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? Earthscan, UK & USA, (2006), pg 15. 
18 http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/history/founding/index.jsp (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
19 http://www.scnorway.ru/eng/history/ (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
20 Damien Kingsbury, Joe Remenyi, John McKay & Janet Hunt, Key Issues in Development, Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York, (2004), pg 49. 
21 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press, UK, (2008), pg 38. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Stephen Browne, Aid & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? Earthscan, UK & USA, (2006), pg 24. 
24 Ibid. 
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By the late 1960s and early 1970s development aid discourse had a focus on 
recipient country ownership and many believed that budget support was the best 
form of aid.25  The World Bank’s 1969 Pearson Commission, which reviewed the 
previous 20 years of development assistance,26 stated: 
‘The formation and execution of development policies must ultimately be 
the responsibility of the recipient alone, but the donors have a right to be 
heard and informed of major events and decisions.’ 27 
Poverty became more of a focus in the 1970s.  Prior to this time there were no 
data even to estimate the number of people worldwide living in poverty.28  In 1970 
the General Assembly of the United Nations set the ODA target for countries at 
0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI).29  Although this target remains in place 
today,30 it has not been achieved by the majority of OECD countries.31   
During the 1970s and 1980s development was linked with economic growth.32  
However economists were discovering that growth did not necessarily mean that 
the benefits of growth would ‘trickle down’ to the poor.33  In 1972 the World Bank, 
in response to these findings, adopted a ‘basic needs approach’.34  This approach 
was to have more of a focus on individuals’ well-being in terms of their food, 
health, education, shelter and clothing.35   
With the economic recession of the late 1980s and with some countries defaulting 
on their debts, donors started to focus on the need to stabilise poor countries ’ 
economies.36  The IMF started focusing on ‘structural adjustment’ programmes 
that required recipient countries to liberalise and deregulate their economies.37  
This era brought in more complexity with donors imposing more conditions to 
                                                          
25 Alf Morten Jerve, Ownership and Partnership: does the new rhetoric solve the incentive problems of aid?  
Chr. Michelsen Institute, NORAD, (2002), pg 8. 
26http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20121526~p
agePK:36726~piPK:36092~theSitePK:29506,00.html (last accessed 28th January 2015). 
27 Alf Morten Jerve, Ownership and Partnership: does the new rhetoric solve the incentive problems of aid?  
Chr. Michelsen Institute, NORAD, (2002), pg 7. 
28 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press, UK, (2008), pg 31. 
29 Ibid, pg 32. 
30 http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htm (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
31 http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm 
(last accessed 9th October 2014) (only 5 of the 28 OECD countries reached their ODA target in 2013). 
32 Stephen Browne, Aid & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? Earthscan, UK & USA, (2006), pg 24. 
33 Ibid, pg 31. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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funding and the linking of policy advice to ODA.38  The move to structural 
adjustment programmes clearly marked a move away from recipient country 
ownership.39 
By the 1990s donors were moving towards the ‘institutional’ agenda of good 
governance and respect for human rights.40  As Browne writes the focus had now 
moved to a ‘do as we say’ approach,41  and with it a further step away from 
recipient country ownership.   
During the 1990s some donors starting to re-focus on approaches that transferred 
more ownership to the recipient country.  Some donors moved back to ‘budget 
support’ funding for both recurrent & capital expenditure by recipient 
governments.42  Other donors started to use a sector-wide approach (SWAp) form 
of funding43  which channelled funds to whole sectors such as health or education 
rather than small discrete projects.44  SWAps were introduced with the aim of 
greater harmonisation and alignment in order to reduce the administrative burden 
on the partner countries and to allow partner countries more leadership in order to 
foster greater partner ownership and sustainability.45   
In 1999 the IMF and World Bank initiated the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs).46  The PRSPs were introduced in recognition of the need for poor 
countries to have ‘ownership’ of their reform programmes.47  PRSPs are prepared 
by the governments of low income countries.  They assess the state of poverty in 
their country and describe the programs that the country will pursue to promote 
growth and reduce poverty in their country.48  The PRSPs are used to help guide 
policies regarding debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative.49 
                                                          
38 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press, UK, (2008), pg 35. 
39 Alf Morten Jerve, Ownership and Partnership: does the new rhetoric solve the incentive problems of aid?  
Chr. Michelsen Institute, NORAD, (2002), pg 10. 
40 Stephen Browne, Aid & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? Earthscan, UK & USA, (2006), pg 24. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press, UK, (2008), pg 47. 
43 Ibid, pg 196. 
44 Ibid, pg 47. 
45 http://www.aid.govt.nz/sites/default/files/SWAps%20-%20Sector%20Wide%20Approaches.pdf (last 
accessed 9th October 2014). 
46 https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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In 2000, leaders of 189 countries signed the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG).50  The MDG were focused around reducing poverty, improving health and 
education, promoting gender equality, ensuring environmentally sustainability and 
developing global partnerships for development.51 
According to the United Nations MDG 2012 report, although progress is being 
made towards most of the goals many donors and recipients are lagging behind 
their targets.52  The report indicates that there are, however, positive signs that 
poverty targets will be met before 2015 target date.53 
In 2005, in an attempt to improve aid effectiveness, over 100 developed and 
developing countries signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.54  The 
Paris Declaration was based on five principles: ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability.55  
The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness set targets to improve aid 
effectiveness by 2010.56  Unfortunately only one of the 13 targets was met.57  A 
2011 evaluation report of the Paris Declaration concluded, however, that almost all 
of the principles and commitments remained relevant in improving the quality of 
aid, that there was far more transparency in aid then than 20-25 years ago, and 
that there was far less donor-driven aid.58 
Following on from the Paris Declaration, and keeping aid effectiveness as a 
central goal, were the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (AAA),59 the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in 201160 and the 2014 Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) meeting in 
Mexico.61 
                                                          
50 http://www.mdgfund.org/content/MDGs (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
51 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press, UK, (2008), pg 42. 
52 United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Report, New York, (2012), pgs 4, 6, 16, 20, 26, 30, 38 & 46.  
53 Ibid, pg 4. 
54 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827300.pdf (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
55 Ibid. 
56 OECD, Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, Better Aid, OECD 
Publishing, (2012), pg 15. 
57 Ibid. The only target met was co-ordinated technical co-operation. 
58 B .Wood, J. Betts, F. Etta, J. Gayfer, D. Kabell, N. Ngwira, F. Sagasti, M. Samaranayake, The Evaluation of 
the Paris Declaration, Final Report, Copenhagen, (2011), pg xv. 
59 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm (last accessed 9th 
October 2014). 
60 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/busanpartnership.htm (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
61 http://effectivecooperation.org/hlm2014/ (last accessed 9th October 2014). 
11 
 
Summary 
Since the beginning of modern aid, the importance of ‘recipient country ownership’ 
has dipped in and out of favour with donors.  During the late 1960s and early 
1970s some donors were focused on recipient country ownership and had 
principles around respecting the needs and priorities of the recipient 
governments.62   
The structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s saw a shift back to more 
donor control and less recipient country ownership.  Since the 1990s the 
importance of recipient country ownership has once again become an important 
focus of donors.  Donors’ commitment to recipient country ownership is reflected in 
the promotion of PRSPs and in different budget support funding models.  In 2005, 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness further acknowledged the need for 
recipient country ownership to ensure aid is more effective. 
  
                                                          
62 Alf Morten Jerve, Ownership and Partnership: does the new rhetoric solve the incentive problems of aid?  
Chr. Michelsen Institute, NORAD, (2002), pg 8. 
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1.2 Aid Effectiveness - Issues 
Since Truman’s speech in 1949, billions of dollars have been invested into trying 
to improve the lives of those in need but many of the concerns that Truman 
expressed remain valid.  This highlights the ineffectiveness of much of the aid 
money already spent and the huge challenges faced in implementing aid projects, 
from the points of view of both donor and recipient countries. 
To understand the effectiveness of aid at a deeper level, more complex questions 
need to be considered.63  For example Riddell asks the questions – Does aid work 
if: 
 ‘There are immediate benefits but they are not sustained? 
 Aid is only channelled to those able to use it well, excluding those who may 
need it but cannot use it well?  For example should aid go to governments 
where corruption is high and there is less chance the aid will be used 
effectively, even though there is a great need for it? 
 Aid contributes to the recipient country but it is not cost effective? 
 Aid achieves the initial output goal but not the long term goal?  For example 
aid is used to send people on a training course to help gain employment, all 
people complete the training, but only a few actually do gain employment 
afterwards. 
 Capacities and governance is strengthened in governments but their 
economy doesn’t grow and their poverty remains high?’ 64 
It is therefore not easy to assess the effectiveness of aid.  It is also important to 
remember, that the answers a donor might give to these questions could be quite 
different from those of a recipient country.  Often the reasons behind the need for 
receiving aid and the need for giving aid are different and hence the answers as to 
what is effective aid will also be different.   
There are many explanations given in aid discourse concerning the reasons for aid 
ineffectiveness.  A common criticism of aid is that it is often intended to advance 
non-developmental objectives of donors.65  There are often other reasons why aid 
                                                          
63 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press, UK, (2008), pg 170. 
64 Ibid, pg 170-171. 
65 Stephen Browne, Aid & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? Earthscan, UK & USA, (2006), pg 9. 
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is given, other than the direct need of the recipient country, such as the donor 
country’s commercial, geopolitical, strategic/security or historical (especially 
colonial) interests.66  Some examples of these counterproductive interests are 
Japan using aid to leverage small states to buy votes in support of allowing 
whaling, Australian aid promoting Australian technology for commercial advantage 
and the US using aid in favour of Israel and Egypt for foreign policy purposes.67   
Tying of aid is something that has always been present in aid and is often 
condemned.  Tying of aid may be in the form of agreements that commodities 
must be purchased from the donor country, that firms managing development 
contracts must be registered in the donor country or that only donor country 
expatriates may be placed as TAs.68  This can lead to the donor country benefiting 
more than the recipient country.  In terms of Australian aid this is often referred to 
as ‘boomerang aid’: aid from Australia given to another country with the majority of 
the aid money eventually ending back up in Australia.    
Donors have been criticised for setting up parallel management structures in an 
attempt to avoid using the recipient countries ’ ineffective ones.69  Having two 
management systems for the same organisation leads to further inefficiencies, 
confusion and issues around sustainability when the donor ’s program ends and its 
system becomes defunct.  When donors use the recipient countries’ systems it 
helps them understand the difficulty recipient countries have in achieving their own 
tasks as well as meeting the donor countries’ reporting requirements.   
As mentioned in section 1.1, the number of conditions attached to aid increased 
considerably in the 1980s.  Placing conditions on aid has often been seen as 
ineffective.70  Inconsistency of conditions imposed by many donors on one 
recipient government has made meeting all the conditions very challenging and 
often led to inefficiencies.  The IMF and World Bank have not always agreed or 
had consistent conditions.71  Booth writes that a core aim of the PRSPs was to 
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reduce the number of uncoordinated demands made on recipient governments, 
but there is little evidence that this has been achieved.72  
Often conditions of aid grants or loans were connected to the recipient country 
changing its policies.  As Browne writes, this type of conditionality can be 
perceived by recipient governments as undermining their sovereignty.73  Browne 
goes on to say that policy change is often seen as desirable by donors for 
ideological reasons but not by recipient governments, who may have many other 
competing domestic pressures.74  Browne states that policy change has to come 
from within and not be enforced by donors.75 
The focus on improving economic growth in developing countries as a way to 
reduce poverty has also had its sceptics.  As mentioned in section 1.1, the 
economic growth of a country does not always mean that those most in need will 
benefit from that growth.  Browne writes ‘research has shown that there has been 
a very uncertain correlation between aid and growth.’76   
Good governance and democracy have also been heralded as the way forward for 
developing countries. However these ideals can also be questioned when we 
consider China as an example of a country with exceptional growth, where there 
has been demonstrably poor governance and no democracy.77  
Donor countries have often been criticised for not reducing or dismantling their 
own trade and agriculture protectionism, which can impact severely on developing 
countries.78  OECD countries have often been called hypocrites for requiring 
developing countries to privatise government assets and liberalise their economies 
while restrictive practices and tariffs of OECD countries cost developing countries 
billions of dollars a year.79  
Aid professionals, although usually experts or competent in their own specific jobs, 
have been criticised for their lack of understanding of the wider world of aid and 
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not learning lessons from past aid interventions.80  Further criticisms have been 
made of the selection, training and conduct of experts in terms of their knowledge 
of local structures and cultures.81 Often aid professionals earning huge salaries 
relative to local wages live in isolated ‘expat’ environments and take little part in 
local social events.82  For aid professionals to be effective they need to understand 
and adapt to the local context. 
The issues identified above do not cover all aid effectiveness issues, but they do 
represent some of the key aid effectiveness concerns.  Many of the issues 
identified may be addressed by the donor focusing more on the transfer of 
‘ownership’ of aid programmes to recipient countries. 
As mentioned in the introduction, if recipient countries had more say about what 
programmes operated in their country there could be less chance of donors 
pushing their own non-developmental objectives. Similarly if recipient countries 
could choose where they procure their aid-funded goods and services, it could 
address the issue of tying aid and may be more cost effective.  The untying of aid 
may also mean that recipient countries may choose to contract more aid 
professionals from their own country or region.  This may address the issue of aid 
professionals not fully understanding the local context. 
With recipient countries having more ownership they could choose their own 
economic growth and trade policies and choose their own forms of government 
and good governance, rather than have policies dictated to them in conditions on 
aid.   
If recipient countries had more ownership of aid processes and their own 
management structures were used by donors, it could address the issue of donors 
using parallel management structures.  Conditions on aid could be managed in a 
more mutually acceptable way if recipient countries were given more ownership of 
their aid programmes.  As Stiglitz writes ‘If the country owns a reform program, 
why is conditionality needed?’83 
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This is not to say that ‘ownership’ is the silver bullet that will address all aid 
effectiveness issues.  Along with more ownership, recipient countries would also 
have more responsibility.  As Riddell states, development aid is provided and 
required by countries that usually have weak capacities and capabilities of 
governments, weak institutions, weak accountability and limited abilities to draw up 
home-grown plans and programmes and to implement them.84  Therefore recipient 
countries may not be ready for full ownership of aid programmes and the transition 
of ownership may take time.   
Another factor that impedes donors transferring ownership is corruption. As the 
2011 OECD report on Aid Effectiveness states, ‘corruption undermines efforts to 
promote development and reduce poverty.  It can distort decision making, access 
to public services and markets.’85  
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Summary  
Riddell states that ‘over the past 20 to 30 years, the evidence suggests that the 
aggregate impact of aid provided by individual donors has increased, although 
from a fairly low base.’86 Aid effectiveness is not, however, improving as much as 
the global community would like.    
Today donors and recipient countries are increasingly focused on working in 
partnership and transferring the ownership of aid programs from donors to 
recipient country organisations as key means to improve aid effectiveness.  
Recipient country ownership is also important in technical assistance projects.  
The next chapter will review what is involved in a technical assistance project and 
what a TA role entails.  The chapter examines different issues that arise in 
technical assistance projects and discusses how recipient country ownership can 
help address them.  As technical assistance projects involve training and change, 
this chapter highlights the importance of ownership not only from the aid delivery 
perspective, but also from the workplace training and change management 
perspectives. 
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Chapter Two - Technical Assistance & Ownership 
2.1 Technical Assistance – Introduction 
Technical assistance projects are invariably about building the capacity of an 
organisation and its people.  The OECD states that most donors view ‘capacity 
development’ (often used interchangeably with ‘capacity building’ and ‘capacity 
strengthening’)87 as a primary objective of their systems of development co-
operation.88  
The OECD defines capacity development as  
‘The process by which individuals, groups and organisations, institutions 
and countries develop, enhance and organise their systems, resources and 
knowledge; all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to 
perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives.’ 89 
To put it more simply, Grindle and Hilderbrand use the definition for capacity 
building ‘improvements in the ability of organisations, either singly or in 
cooperation with other organisations, to perform appropriate tasks.’90 
There is a range of means available to improve the ability of organisations to 
perform tasks.  Of these, technical assistance is the most common practice 
traditionally used by donors to promote capacity development.91  ‘Technical 
assistance’ (often used interchangeably with ‘technical cooperation’)92 may be in 
the form of: 
1. Study assistance through scholarships and traineeships, 
2. Research into the problems of developing countries, including diseases, 
3. Personnel experts, including long and short term deployments of both 
expatriate and national personnel.93   
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‘Technical assistance’ can serve different purposes.94  The European Commission 
divides the purpose of technical assistance into four areas:  
1. Capacity Development – often comprehensive and complex, 
2. Policy/Expert Advice – often short term, limited in scope and purely 
technical in                      nature, 
3. Implementation – where there is limited capacity in the recipient country 
and it cannot manage the implementation of urgent service delivery 
programmes, 
4. Preparation or Facilitation of Cooperation – where expertise is required 
in the formulation of a programme.95 
The research in this thesis will focus on the operational side of technical 
assistance provided by personnel experts for capacity development.  A personnel 
expert, or, as used in this thesis, technical advisor (TA), has a unique position.  
Many TAs will be contracted for one to two years to work side-by-side with a 
recipient country counterpart each day.  As the TA and counterpart work so closely 
together a good working relationship is vital to the success of the project.    
The main purpose of many TAs’ assignments is to both build the capacity of their 
counterpart so that the counterpart can more effectively and efficiently carry out 
his or her duties and to build the capacity of the counterpart’s organisation.  The 
main focus is on training (capacity building) the counterpart, which may include the 
TA working with the counterpart on improving processes, procedures, policy etc, 
this often means implementing change within the organisation.  
As the TA and the counterpart are working together on a daily basis, they are also 
working together on carrying out the normal duties of that role.  The TAs role is 
different from a consultant’s role.  A consultant may be contracted to carry out a 
certain task; as the TA is not employed to carry out that task, but to build the 
capacity of the counterpart so the counterpart can carry out the task.   
Often TAs step over this line, and get involved in completing the task.  There are 
many reasons why this can happen, such as a deadline is going to be missed if 
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the TA does not step in and the local manager expects the TA to ensure the task 
is completed; or a lack of capacity building skills on the part of the TA; or achieving 
the task is a goal set in the TA’s ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) and therefore failure 
to complete the task reflects on the TA’s performance.  The TA’s ToR, therefore, 
need to be clear to be sure that all parties understand what the role of the TA is. 
The TA/counterpart model for capacity building in developing countries is quite a 
different approach to capacity building from that used in developed countries.  It is 
highly unlikely that a government in a developed country would contract a trainer 
(i.e. the TA) for one to two years, to work side by side with one of their staff 
members in order to build his or her capacity.  The TA role is therefore unique and 
creates its own unique challenges, which cannot be approached the same way as 
if the TA was a trainer, consultant or change manager working in a developed 
country. 
The large difference in capacity building approaches does raise the question of 
whether TA/counterpart arrangements are the best way to build capacity in 
developing countries.  This thesis does not explore that question in any depth, but 
only identifies it as a separate issue. 
Brief History of Technical Assistance  
Technical assistance can be traced back as far as the 18th century when Peter the 
Great invited the best engineers, shipbuilders, architects and craftsman from 
Europe to assist in the modernisation of Russia.96  In the mid-19th century Japan 
brought in over 3,000 foreign experts to assist the country to ‘catch up with the 
West’.97 
Of more modern times, Morgan breaks down technical assistance into three 
generations.  Over the three generations we see donors’ emphasis on recipient 
country ownership transition from negligible, to a major focus in donors’ delivery of 
technical assistance projects: 
First Generation: (1960’s-80’s) During this period technical assistance 
projects were mostly supply (donor) driven and therefore had little focus on 
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recipient country ownership.  Donors’ technical assistance projects were 
focused on gap filling of individuals and the transfer of knowledge and 
techniques.   
Second Generation: (turn of the century forward) During this period donors 
started to focus on country commitment and ownership.  Technical 
assistance became more centred on capacity development.  In response to 
recipient country demands, donors’ started to allow recipient countries more 
control, clarity and accountability of technical assistance projects. 
Third Generation (emerging) Today, the trend for recipient country 
ownership intensifies with the Paris Declaration.  Today donors’ have a 
better understanding of complexities of development and see indigenous 
institutions, cultures and structures as key dynamics of change.  Donors’ 
are now making a deliberate effort to shift control and decision making to 
local systems and actors, building on their strengths not weaknesses.98 
Riddell talks about aid in the early years being focused on filling skills and 
knowledge gaps with the assumption that these skills were largely held by donor 
countries and they (simply) needed to be transferred to recipient countries.99  
Riddell goes on to say that technical assistance was either linked to other aid 
projects or free standing skills training initiatives, and that both types continue 
today.100 
As mentioned in the introduction, according to the OECD around 25% of overall 
ODA is spent on technical assistance.101  This represents in absolute terms 
around $25 billion USD a year.102  In 2012 the New Zealand and Australian ratio of 
technical assistance to ODA was 18% and 38% respectively.  For New Zealand 
this equates to $79m of $449m ODA and for Australia $2,048m of $5,403m 
ODA.103  Therefore technical assistance is a significant part of ODA for all 
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countries, including New Zealand and Australia.  
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Summary 
Technical assistance projects are invariably about building the capacity of an 
organisation and its people and have always been a large part of aid development 
programmes.   
There are many ways to build capacity, however this thesis focuses on technical 
assistance projects that have a donor supplied TA, who is contracted to build the 
capacity of the recipient country counterpart and the counterpart’s organisation. 
The provision of technical advisors, is a unique way to carry out capacity building.  
Their role therefore has its own unique challenges. 
 
2.2 Technical Assistance & Ownership 
As we have seen, many donor organisations have recognised the importance of 
transferring ‘ownership’ from the donor to the recipient country when working in 
development projects, including technical assistance projects.  The OECD states 
‘that without ownership, aid cannot be effective in reducing poverty and promoting 
sustainable economic development.’104  The OECD also states that ownership is 
essential because ‘the forces for change will only arise out of the political and 
social system of the [recipient] country.’105 
The findings of a report by Baser and Morgan state ‘progress on capacity 
development depends critically on the level of ownership, commitment and 
motivation of country actors, i.e. their ability to commit and engage.’106  
The World Bank & IMF strongly promote country ownership, stating of PRSPs that 
they ‘should be prepared through a country-driven process, including broad 
participation, that promotes country ownership of the strategy and its 
implementation.’107  
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The importance of transferring ownership to the recipient country is also reiterated 
in the Paris Declaration, the first of the Declaration’s five principles being 
‘ownership.’108  Under the ownership principle, the Declaration states the donors’ 
commitment as: ‘respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their 
capacity to exercise it’.109  The principle encourages recipient countries to develop 
their own NDS to address their own development needs.110 
Transfer of ownership is often discussed in aid-related discourse at the country 
level or management level of aid projects, for example in the development of the 
NDS and PRSPs.  This thesis also addresses the transfer of ownership at the 
operational level, at the level where aid projects are actually carried out.   
If ownership is to be transferred fully from donor countries to recipient countries, 
the transfer of ownership needs to happen at all levels, from the management 
level down to the operational level.  Much of the success of technical assistance 
projects will rely on what happens at the operational level, at the level where 
capacity building is carried out.   
The ‘Bonn Consensus’, a joint workshop between the OECD and the German 
government in preparation for the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action,111 reiterates the 
importance of ownership at the operational level in technical assistance projects in 
one of its six areas of action.  It states: 
To enable developing countries to exercise ownership of capacity 
development through technical co-operation, external partners agree to: 
a) the joint selection and management of technical co-operation to support 
local joint selection and management of technical co-operation to 
support local priorities, 
b) expand the choice of technical co-operation providers to ensure access 
to sources of local and south-south expertise.112 
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Stephen Browne, in his book, Developing Capacity Through Technical 
Cooperation, comments on the importance of transferring ownership at the 
operational level.  Browne states that ‘local stakeholders need to be part of the 
discussions on terms of references, the selection of suppliers, project 
management & staffing and monitoring & evaluation.’113   
A report by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), stated 
that ‘Ownership is about who decides what in the process of aid delivery, who 
initiates and identifies the needs, who prioritizes, who plans and designs, who 
makes procurement, who implements, who supervises, who evaluates.’114 
NORAD states that ‘ownership’ in this sense refers to the same concerns as the 
term ‘recipient responsibilities’ which NORAD describes as: 
‘the recipient is to define needs, prioritise activities, make policy decisions, 
direct the planning of activities and their implementation, allocate resources, 
facilitate effective utilisation of external and internal resources, and be 
responsible for the actual implementation.’ 115 
The term ‘ownership’ in aid discourse can be applied in different ways, but for the 
purposes of this research the focus of ‘ownership’ will follow the NORAD example 
and look at the practical implementation of capacity building technical assistance 
programmes designed with a technical advisor and a local counterpart.  
As stated earlier, capacity building can be defined as ‘improvements in the ability 
of organisations, either singly or in cooperation with other organisations, to 
perform appropriate tasks.’116  One of the key mechanisms in capacity building is 
the transfer of skills and knowledge.117   
A workplace learning review completed by the New Zealand Council for 
Educational Research highlighted some key principles about learning in the 
workplace that are also important in capacity building projects.   The review states, 
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for example, that workplace learning works best when: ‘Learners are engaged and 
have some ownership of the goals and processes’, ‘workplace learning is aligned 
or reflects the (desired) workplace culture’ and ‘the teaching is sensitive to the 
learner’s pace and level’.118   
When capacity building is taking place it is therefore very important that the 
counterpart actually wants to be involved in the capacity building process and is 
engaged.  It is also very important that the counterpart has some feeling of 
ownership of his or her learning process, that the training is appropriate for the 
organisation and that the training is carried out at the counterpart’s pace and not 
the pace of the TA.  The focus of the capacity building should be squarely on what 
the recipient organisation and individuals require in their learning.   
In a counterpart/TA relationship, there is often a power imbalance, with much of 
the perceived power sitting with the TA.119  This power imbalance may be 
connected with the TA’s link to financial resources, that TAs are perceived to have 
more knowledge and experience than the counterpart and that being an ‘expert’ 
TAs can have a higher status than the counterpart.120  The power imbalance may 
be amplified when there are old colonial ties between the technical advisor’s 
country and the counterpart’s country. 
The issue of power imbalance can make the transfer of ownership more 
challenging.  Aid literature cites ‘power imbalance’ as a contributing factor to the 
failure of capacity building.121  It is important that the counterpart/TA relationship is 
on a more even playing field.  The ability to achieve a more even playing field is 
often down to how the technical advisor approaches the relationship.    
Often in capacity building technical assistance projects, the TA will be involved in 
implementing changes, for example changes to processes, system or policy. 
Implementing change has its own set of challenges.  When organisations are 
changing, people are key to the process and must be included from the outset.122   
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Robert Paton and James McCalman, write in their change management book 
‘Through active participation you accomplish two things.  You gain commitment 
and ownership of the change process by all: those experiencing the change will 
not need to be pushed and they will begin to drive change themselves.’123  They 
go on to say ‘When people feel ownership of the change process and can see the 
opportunities it offers, then they will be committed to its satisfactory 
accomplishment.’124 
The authors also state that ‘Change management is about people 
management.’125  They state the following basic requirements in change 
management: openness, communication, involvement and empowerment.126 
These ‘basics’ of change management are also key also in the counterpart/TA 
relationship.  For any changes to be made, whether at an organisational or 
individual level, there must be ‘buy-in’ from the counterpart.  In order for change to 
be sustained after the project ends, the change process needs to be owned by 
those in the organisation (i.e. the counterpart) rather than those that are bringing in 
the changes (i.e. the TA). 
Paton and McCalman go on to say that change agents need to have abilities over 
and above their functional skills and knowledge: they need to feel comfortable in 
dealing with interpersonal relationships, coping with conflict, ambiguity and human 
emotions.127  They go on to say that technical skills can be readily taught and 
acquired, however people skills are the more important and often the more difficult 
competencies for people to acquire.128 
Summary 
As we can see, recipient countries’ ownership in capacity-building technical 
assistance projects is not only important for effective aid delivery, but also for 
learning to take place, for changes to be made, and for projects to be sustainable.  
If ownership at the management level is shifting to the recipient country but there 
is no transfer of ownership at the operational level when implementing the project, 
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then ownership is not transferring fully and the project is unlikely to have any 
lasting positive effect.  As stated by the European Commission in their guide 
Making Technical Cooperation more Effective, ‘Ownership is not expressed in 
words but by continuous action.’129 
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2.3 Technical Assistance - Effectiveness Issues 
Technical assistance is often considered ineffective.  According to Berg, ‘almost 
everybody acknowledges the ineffectiveness of technical cooperation in what is or 
should be its major objective: achievement of greater self-reliance in the recipient 
countries by building institutions and strengthening local capacities in national 
economic management.’130  
Technical assistance critics have spanned the history of modern aid.  In 1969 the 
World Bank’s Pearson Commission noted that ‘technical assistance often 
develops a life of its own, little related either in donor or recipient countries to 
national or global development objectives.’131  In 1991 an OECD/DAC report 
stated that ‘donor technical cooperation was too fragmented to create sustainable 
systemic capacity in developing countries, and may have contributed to preventing 
the emergence of sustained local capacities’.132  In 1993 the World Bank vice 
president, Edward Jaycox, described technical assistance as ‘a systematic 
destructive force that is undermining the development of capacity.’133 
In 2002 the then Dutch Minister for Development Co-operation stated ‘The 
presence of so many experts in Africa in particular has undermined the confidence 
of countries in their own abilities.  Technical assistance has not done enough to 
give poor countries the ability to stand on their own two feet.’134  In the same year 
the Dutch Minister decided to discontinue the provision of technical assistance.135  
In 2006 the former Director of Budget in the Ministry of Finance in Afghanistan 
stated ‘Afghanistan is a failure as a case for technical assistance.’136 
There have, however, been some successes in technical assistance.  Morgan 
writes that in the later part of the 20th century technical assistance made genuine 
contributions, especially in areas such as meteorology, agriculture, health, 
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population and high technology.137  These successes appear to be linked through 
the commonality of being in non-political environments.138   
Morgan does however go on to say that technical assistance has had a pattern of 
poor performance and had been labelled ‘corrosive’ by the UNDP.139  He also 
states that technical assistance has led ‘to the erosion of the ownership, 
commitment and independent action of national actors’ and ‘in too many cases led 
to a sense of dependence.’140 
Greenhill refers to reviews undertaken by the UNDP that show that technical 
assistance had been effective at getting the job done, but far less effective in 
developing local institutions and strengthening local capacities.141 
Riddell reiterates this by stating that ‘short-term technical assistance has had a 
tangible positive effect, but donors have been far less able to make lasting 
contributions to capacity development and institutional strengthening.’142 
Overall, technical assistance given to countries in need, comprising a quarter of 
the world’s ODA, is failing to achieve its goals. In the commercial world an activity 
that consistently showed such poor performance would have been axed long ago. 
So why do donor countries continue to spend so much of their ODA on technical 
assistance? 
Greenhill argues that donors need to maintain control as they have pressure from 
their superiors to disburse funds and ensure projects are delivered on time, as well 
as ensuring that aid money is well spent.143  Contracting TAs who work directly in 
the recipient organisation assists with meeting those requirements.144   
Greenhill goes onto to say that donors use technical assistance in conjunction with 
conditions on aid to promote reforms they consider important.145  Greenhill further 
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states that technical assistance contributes to donors’ geopolitical objectives by 
increasing their ability to influence political decisions in line with the donors’ 
priorities and also provides a good source of income for donor country firms.146  
Morgan reiterates this point by stating that many technical assistance projects 
were ‘designed to meet supplier objectives such as commercial gain, political 
support or cultural penetration.’147   
With all the pitfalls of technical assistance, it is important to acknowledge that 
technical assistance, when implemented well, can provide excellent support to 
capacity development and also help ensure sustainability.148 
There are many issues that are consistently associated with the poor performance 
of technical assistance projects and many of those issues relate to aid 
ineffectiveness in general.  Many of the issues identified can also be addressed by 
donors allowing more recipient country ownership.  The issues can be split into 
two groups: management issues and operational issues. 
Management issues, as the name suggests, are related to how the technical 
assistance project is managed.  Management issues often involve people in senior 
positions, such as the recipient country administrative head of government 
department (managers) and donor representatives.   
A common management issue identified by aid experts is that technical assistance 
projects are donor ‘supply’ driven, rather than recipient country ‘demand’ driven.149  
With a lack of recipient demand and therefore a lack of ownership of the project, 
the advice given can have a tendency to be ignored and, worse, be irrelevant to 
the recipient country.150  
Donor ‘supply’ driven technical assistance projects can undermine local capacity 
and often lack sustainability.151  The more that reforms are seen to be shaped by 
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external advisors, the higher the likelihood that the recipient organisation’s sense 
of accountability for the development outcomes will erode.152    
In donor ‘supply’ driven projects, technical assistance is often offered on a ‘take it 
or leave it’ basis.153  Unfortunately, the offer of technical assistance can be seen 
as a ‘free good’ and it is often accepted without having alternative uses of the 
funding offered or considered.154   
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, under its ownership principle, 
recognises the importance of recipient country demand driven projects.  The 
declaration encourages recipient countries to set their own national development 
strategies and for donors to respect the recipient countries’ leadership over their 
development policies and strategies.155  
Botswana is a good example of a country that has taken ownership of much of its 
donor aid,156 and ensuring its projects are demand driven.  The Botswanan 
Government rejects all assistance that is not channelled through national budgets 
and financial management systems.157  All technical assistance is contracted by 
the government and integrated into the human resource planning of the public 
service.158 
Another management issue relates to aid funding.  Although many donors today 
are moving towards recipient countries having more ownership of their aid funding 
through budget support models, SWAps etc, the bulk of technical assistance 
funding is rarely ‘entrusted to or seen by recipients’.159  If donors allowed more 
recipient country ownership of aid funding, recipient countries would have more 
responsibility, which may increase their commitment and help ensure that funds 
are better integrated into their NDSs.  This should lead to better utilisation of 
technical assistance resources.160   
                                                          
152 Arild O. Hauge, Accountability – to What End? Development Policy Journal, UNDP, Vol 2, (2002), pg 77. 
153 Romilly Greenhill, Realaid: Making technical assistance work, ActionAid International, Johannesburg, 
(2006), pg 40. 
154 Ibid. 
155 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf (last accessed 18th January 2015). 
156 Arild O. Hauge, Accountability – to What End? Development Policy Journal, UNDP, Vol 2, (2002), pg 88. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Romilly Greenhill, Realaid: Making technical assistance work, ActionAid International, Johannesburg, 
(2006), pg 45. 
159 Arild O. Hauge, Accountability – to What End? Development Policy Journal, UNDP, Vol 2, (2002), pg 80. 
160 Anders Danielson Paul Hoebink & Benedict Mongula, Are Donors Ready for Change? Development Policy 
Journal, UNDP, Vol 2 (2002), pg 167. 
33 
 
As mentioned earlier, a further management issue is the tying of aid.  Technical 
assistance projects are often criticised for ‘tying’ the funding for TAs, which incurs 
greater costs.161  Riddell highlights a Ugandan example of long-term technical 
assistance where costs were 100% to 300% more when recruited through bilateral 
agencies than other sources.162   
The tying of aid can be both official and unofficial, with many countries that have 
formally untied their aid still recruiting firms largely from their own country.163  In 
the 2005-06 year the United Kingdom, where aid is untied, awarded at least 80% 
of its aid contracts to United Kingdom firms.164  If recipient country managers were 
able to make their own decisions about the procurement of aid goods and 
services, then the issue around ‘tying of aid’ would no longer be relevant.   
Another technical issue at the managerial level is how the TA’s ToR are 
developed.  Often rewards for aid workers (including TAs) are focused on meeting 
output targets and not on achieving long-term sustainable development.165  Often 
TA contracts or expected outputs do not have any performance indicators relating 
to capacity building.166  
How the ToR are drafted can affect how the TA implements the technical 
assistance project at the operational level.  If a TA’s ToR have targets mainly 
based on achieving certain outputs (eg corporate plans are completed or budgets 
are approved), the TA will often focus on achieving those output targets.  As a 
result the capacity building aspect of the role can be neglected.   
Sometimes the TA’s ToR require the TA to perform a skilled job and to train 
recipient country counterparts at the same time.167  For example, Australian 
Treasury advisors have always been asked to strike a balance between the twin 
objectives of improved capacity and good policy outcomes.168  Riddell states that 
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when advisors have been required to undertake roles with this dual purpose, some 
TAs have been successful in completing both objectives, but it was far more 
common for advisors to prioritise completing the technical task rather than the 
capacity building task.169  
When a TA’s ToR have a dual purpose of performing a technical role and training, 
the ToR must have separate goals and targets for each purpose.  The recipient 
country managers and donors need to work closely together to ensure that the 
most effective ToR for each type of TA role are compiled and implemented.  
A further management issue the technical assistance literature discusses is also 
connected to the recruitment of TAs.  Often TAs are selected for their technical 
expertise and not for their ability to train or mentor staff,170 and therefore TAs often 
lack expertise in capacity building.171  Ensuring TAs have the right skill set is vital 
in ensuring an effective project.  Recipient country managers should play a key 
part in the process of TA recruitment to ensure the best TAs are selected. 
The second group of issues, operational issues, is related to how the technical 
assistance project is actually carried out.  Issues at the operational level often 
involve people working directly in the implementation of the technical assistance 
project, such as the TA and the counterpart. 
When TAs implement changes in recipient countries, they often try to replicate the 
systems and processes from their own countries without enough consideration of 
the local country context.  It is unlikely that a single ‘blueprint’ approach to 
technical assistance will be effective.172  Often so-called ‘best practices’ in one 
country are not ‘best practices’ in all countries and therefore assumptions about 
transferability of practices should be viewed with caution.173   
If counterparts and their supervisors are given more control around changes that 
TAs want to implement, it is more likely that changes will be more appropriate and 
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effective and that the counterparts will be more committed to the changes, which 
will increase the likelihood that changes are sustainable. 
Another operational issue relates to the consistency of advice given by successive 
TAs.   This issue is common in long term projects where donors do little to ensure 
co-ordination between advisors.  In many cases aid organisations have poor 
institutional memory.174  A review by ActionAid reported the Cambodian 
Government stating ‘when foreign advisors change, they often provide advice 
which contradicts that of the previous advisor.’175  
When a counterpart receives conflicting advice from successive TAs, it can 
obviously cause confusion and in some cases can lead to de-capacitating the 
counterpart.  Although this issue is at the operational level, it could be addressed 
by recipient country managers, donors and TAs working closely together to ensure 
that the overall agreed objectives, and the way to achieve them, remains 
consistent. 
A further operational issue is the lack of involvement counterparts have in their 
TAs’ performance management.  Although recipient country counterparts are the 
people who work most closely with TAs, they are invariably, excluded from the TA 
performance management process.176   It is more likely that the TA will be 
supervised by the donor or the agency responsible for managing the project on the 
ground, or both.177  For example, Australian Treasury advisors remain attached to 
the Australian Treasury for performance appraisals and promotions.178   
The lack of recipient country ownership around TA performance management can 
leave both counterpart and managers dis-empowered.  If recipient countries had 
more ownership, then recipient country counterparts or the counterpart’s 
supervisor could take the lead in the TA performance management process.  This 
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may improve the overall performance of the TA from the recipient countries 
perspective.    
When considering the issues around technical assistance, it is important to 
remember that often TAs are working in challenging environments. Technical 
Advisors’ ability to build capacity is directly affected by the broader context 
(economic, political & social) that they are operating in.179   
Without government commitment and political support from the recipient country, 
capacity building can be very challenging.  A World Bank review reiterated this by 
acknowledging that the greatest successes for capacity building occurred when 
there was political support for them.180  The OECD state that ‘capacity 
development requires strong ownership and leadership by country champions with 
sufficient power and dedication to overcome inertia and resistance to change.’181 
It is also challenging to build capacity in organisations that suffer from 
disincentives such as low salaries, few promotions for local staff and widespread 
corruption.182  As mentioned in section 1.2, often corruption is seen as a major 
reason why donors can be reluctant to hand over ownership of projects.183   
When the recipient country has insufficient capacity to ensure that ‘active’ 
ownership takes place, however, this disability will limit the level of capacity 
building that can be achieved by the technical advisor.184  It is not always easy for 
TAs to build capacity, as reiterated in a World Bank report that admitted ‘we do not 
understand fully how to help improve institutions and governance, especially in the 
poorest countries where the needs are greatest.’185 
Summary  
Technical assistance projects have been widely criticised for being ineffective ever 
since they first began.  The core objective of most technical assistance projects is 
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to build capacity; but they are often criticised for doing the complete opposite.  
They have even been criticised for preventing the emergence of local capacity.  
Issues in technical assistance projects can be split into two groups: management 
issues and operational issues.  Many of the management issues relate to how the 
technical assistance program is identified, designed and managed.  Some 
management issues can be addressed by donors allowing recipient countries 
more ownership of technical assistance projects - for example, recipient countries 
having more ownership over identifying the needs of projects, aid funding and in 
the procurement of aid goods and services.  Other management issues can be 
addressed by improving how the TA’s ToR is designed and by ensuring that TAs 
have the appropriate skill set. 
Many technical assistance operational issues are related to how the TA works and 
what involvement the counterpart has in the project.  If counterparts and their 
supervisors had more control over the implementation of technical assistance 
projects, it would help to address issues concerning inappropriate changes 
implemented by TAs.  If counterparts are involved in TAs’ performance appraisals, 
it may improve how TAs work with counterparts, which may improve TAs’ overall 
performance. 
To avoid inconsistent advice from successive TAs, donors need to brief incoming 
TAs about previous TAs’ experiences and to ensure that incoming TAs have a 
good understanding of the objectives of the project.  
Technical advisors often work in challenging environments.  They are, however, 
paid to build capacity of counterparts in developing countries, where conditions for 
everyone are often challenging.  The more donors and TAs allow recipient country 
managers and counterparts to have more ownership of projects, the more effective 
and sustainable technical assistance projects will be. 
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2.4 Chapter Two – Technical Assistance & Ownership – Summary 
Chapter two has explained that technical assistance is typically about building the 
capacity of an organisation and its people.  Many of the issues with technical 
assistance are reflected in broader aid effectiveness issues, as discussed in 
Chapter one. 
The literature on technical assistance has shown that there is a considerable 
amount of dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of technical assistance.  The 
significant amount of criticism is very concerning, if we consider that 25% of 
worldwide ODA is spent on technical assistance. 
As reiterated earlier, recipient country ownership has become an important focus 
of many donors’ efforts to improve the effectiveness of aid.  Recipient country 
ownership, however, is not only important from an aid perspective.  It is also 
important in workplace training and in change management processes.  As TAs 
are working in an aid environment, carrying out training and often bringing in 
changes, ownership becomes even more a key factor in technical assistance 
projects.  
In this chapter I have shown that technical assistance issues can be divided into 
two categories: management issues and operational issues.  Many management 
issues can be addressed by donors allowing more ownership to recipient country 
managers.  Many operational issues can also be addressed by giving the recipient 
country more ownership, but in operational issues it is both donors and TAs who 
need to transfer ownership to counterparts and their supervisors.   
The issues found in the literature on technical assistance, and discussed in 
chapter two, frame my primary research to analyse levels of ownership in technical 
assistance projects in the Solomon Islands, which is detailed in Chapter four.   
Before we look at those findings, however, I will give some background information 
on the Solomon Islands and give some context to technical assistance projects 
there.  I will also review some donors’ assessments of technical assistance 
projects in the Solomon Islands, to see whether the same issues identified in aid 
literature in this chapter have also been identified in the donor assessments.  
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Chapter Three - Solomon Islands Background 
3.1 Solomon Islands – Facts and Figures 
The Solomon Islands is located in the south-west Pacific Ocean186 between Papua 
New Guinea and Vanuatu.  It covers 27,556 square kilometres and is spread over 
922 islands.187  It has a population of 550,000 (2012) of which 79% (2013) live in 
rural areas and 40% (2013) of the population are under the age of 15 years old.188   
The capital is Honiara.  It has a population of 68,000 (2011) and is situated in 
Guadalcanal, one of the 9 provinces in the Solomon Islands.189  The other 8 
provinces are Malaita, Western, Central, Choiseul, Makira, Rennell & Bellona, 
Isabel and Temotu.190  
English is the official language in the Solomon Islands, but Solomon Islands Pijin 
is the lingua franca for the majority of people.191  Sixty three other distinct 
languages are spoken in the country.192  In more rural areas the local language is 
predominant and in some areas neither English nor Pijin is spoken. 
The Solomon Islands gained independence from Great Britain on the 7th July 
1978 at which time it joined the Commonwealth.193  It has a Westminster-style 
parliamentary democracy,194 with 50 Members of Parliament elected for a four 
year term under a first-past-the-post electoral system.195  The Prime Minister is 
chosen by Parliament.196 
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The Solomon Islands’ major trading partners for exports are China (40.4%), 
Australia (24%) and the United Kingdom (8.2%).197  The major exports are logs, 
minerals (primarily alluvial gold), palm oil and kernel, fish, cocoa, coconut oil and 
copra and sawn timber.198  The principal import sources are Australia (28.7%), 
Singapore (21.4%), China (7.8%) and New Zealand (6%).  The main imports are 
refined petroleum, rice, large construction vehicles, delivery trucks and cars.199 
The Solomon Islands is a Least Developed Country (LDC)200 with a Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of $1.096 billion USD and a GNI per capita of $1,610 
USD (2013).201  The Solomon Islands is a member of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group Free Trade Area (MSG-FTA), the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement 
(PICTA), the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO).202  Aid receipts account for approximately 25% 
of the Solomon Islands GDP, making it one of the most aid-dependent countries in 
the Pacific.203   
The Solomon Islands has been a member of the United Nations since 1978 (year 
of independence).204  The Solomon Islands has signed up to the MDG’s205 and to 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.206  Currently there are many 
international organisations operating in the Solomon Islands including: the United 
Nations,207 the World Bank,208 the Asian Development Bank (ADB),209 the 
International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC),210 the European Union (EU),211 
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Save the Children,212 World Vision,213 Oxfam,214 and the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community (SPC).215   
Countries that have diplomatic presence in the Solomon Islands include: New 
Zealand, 216 Australia,217 Republic of China (Taiwan),218 Britain,219 Japan,220  and 
Papua New Guinea.221  In 2011, the Solomon Islands received 9% of New 
Zealand’s ODA, making it the second largest recipient country of New Zealand 
ODA.222  In the 2011/12 financial year, the Australian Government figures for ODA 
show the Solomon Islands as its fourth largest recipient of aid, at 6% of Australian 
ODA.223 
 
3.2 Solomon Islands – Brief History 
In 1893, the British Government established a protectorate over what we know 
today as the Solomon Islands.224  As mentioned in section 3.1, the Solomon 
Islands gained independence from the British in 1978. 
During 1998 to 2003 the Solomon Islands experienced civil unrest, commonly 
known as the ‘ethnic tensions’.225  The conflict had its roots in a complex mix of 
economic, social and ethnic issues centred around two main ethnic groups, being 
those from Malaita and Guadalcanal.226  There were violent clashes involving rival 
militant groups over the five year period, which significantly destabilised the 
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Solomon Islands.227  During the ‘ethnic tensions’ more than 200 people were killed 
and thousands were adversely affected.228   
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3.3 Solomon Islands – Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) 
After unsuccessful requests for help with the ‘ethnic tensions’ by two Solomon 
Islands Prime Ministers, Ulufa’alu in 2000 and Sogavare229 in 2001,230 the 
Australian Government agreed in June 2003 to lead a cooperative intervention 231 
which resulted in the formation of RAMSI.232 
The intervention was subject to obtaining the support of the Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIF) and the passing of legislation by the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) to 
enable the intervention.  The RAMSI treaty, an agreement between the SIG and 
the other members of the PIF, established the legal framework for the mission’s 
deployment.  The Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 gave effect to 
the RAMSI treaty,233 allowing the first RAMSI personnel to be deployed in July 
2003.234 
The 15 countries from the PIF make up the members of RAMSI.235 The initial 
deployment of police and military personnel were made up as follows:  Australia 
(1,575), New Zealand (273), Fiji (136), Papua New Guinea (83), Samoa (15), 
Tonga (45), Kiribati (5) and Cook Islands (2).236   
Prior to the July 2003 intervention, the Solomon Islands Government was barely 
functioning.  Government funds had been ransacked and bled dry by a small 
number of the population who were either ex-militants or corrupt politicians.237  
You could not say, however, that the government authority had collapsed.  A 
government was in place throughout the tensions period 1998-2003.  After the 
coup in June 2000 the militants did not try and take over government.  They 
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installed the then leader of the opposition Manasseh Sogavare to replace the 
ousted Prime Minister.  In December 2001 elections were held and Sir Allan 
Kemakeza, became the Prime Minister.238   
Australia provided aid to the Solomon Islands throughout 1998-2003.  The 
Australian Government position was that the way forward was up to Solomon 
Islanders, and that solutions had to be developed within the country and not 
imposed from the outside.239  In January 2003 the Australian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Alexander Downer, stated: 
“Sending in Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands would be folly 
in the extreme.  It would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would 
be difficult to justify to Australian tax payers…..it would not 
work….foreigners do not have answers for the deep-seated problems 
afflicting Solomon Islands.”240   
Yet by July 2003 the Australian Government had assembled the RAMSI force and 
had landed in the Solomon Islands.  When the Australian government accepted 
the request for help by the then Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza, Australian 
Prime Minister Howard made it clear that intervention would be an ‘all or nothing’ 
exercise.241  It would not focus solely on restoring law and order, it would also 
include deployment of expatriate personnel into the Finance Ministry, Prisons and 
the Justice Department, and would require unhindered access to payroll and other 
financial records.242  The Australian Foreign Minister at the time, Alexander 
Downer, stated ‘that it would be necessary to completely redesign the place.’243 
RAMSI was founded on three key pillars:  
1. Law and Justice,  
2. Economic Governance and Growth,  
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3. Machinery of Government.244 
The relationship between the SIG and RAMSI has at times been fractious.  This 
was especially so during the previous term in office of the current Solomon Islands 
Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, between May 2006 and December 2007.245  
During that term, Sogavare questioned the legal basis for RAMSI and ‘alleged the 
support given to RAMSI was the result of a lack of knowledge and ignorance.’246  
Sogavare also challenged the need for such a large number of RAMSI TAs.247 
Although the numbers of RAMSI soldiers present in the Solomon Islands 
decreased rapidly not long after the RAMSI intervention, the numbers of RAMSI 
TAs deployed to the Solomon Islands rapidly increased.  The total number of 
personnel deployed to the Solomon Islands in 2006 by all donors was 473, of 
which 364 were RAMSI personnel.248  This is a relatively large number when you 
consider the total number of public servants prior to the ethnic tension was 
approximately 7,500249 and the population of Honiara at that time was 50,000.250  
Over the ten year duration of the RAMSI mission, Australia funded around 86% of 
its costs.251  The two largest contributors were Australia (expenditure of 
approximately AUD $2,400 million) and New Zealand (expenditure of NZD $347.5 
million).252  A report based on the 2007-08 financial year found that only 10.5% of 
RAMSI’s expenditure remained in the Solomon Islands,253  hence the reference to 
‘boomerang aid’, that ends up back in the country that provided the aid.  A large 
proportion of this ‘boomerang aid’ returned to the donor country in the form of 
expatriate TAs’ salaries. 
On the 1st of July 2013, RAMSI's military component was withdrawn and most of 
RAMSI’s development assistance activities were transferred to bi-lateral 
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programs.254  At the time of writing, the only area where RAMSI continues to 
operate in is building the capacity of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force.255 
 
3.4 Solomon Islands – RAMSI and Technical Assistance 
RAMSI was largely a technical assistance operation.256  A 2007 report reviewing 
the ‘Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel in the Solomon Islands’ looking 
at the RAMSI experience, stated that ‘The SIG seems to have a paradoxical 
attitude towards technical assistance personnel, on the one hand viewing technical 
assistance as historically largely ineffective, and on the other indicating a 
significant need for technical assistance in the long term.’257 
The report went on to say that the absorptive capacity of the Solomon Islands was 
stretched, that many RAMSI activities had followed a direct approach258 and the 
engagement of SIG had been low.259  The report suggested that to help ensure 
sustainability, RAMSI should consider shifting from a ‘task orientated [approach] to 
one that built more on the interests and motivations of Solomon Islanders ’,260 in 
other words give more ownership to Solomon Islanders to decide what they need 
in aid assistance.  It also expressed the importance of involving the SIG in 
assessment processes.261 
The report discussed the tension around the twin objectives of RAMSI of getting 
the job done and developing capacity.262  The report went on to say that Australia 
was heavily focused on tangible results and those results were a prerequisite for 
funding further activities.263  It suggested that incentives need to encourage TAs to 
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take indirect approaches and to ensure that Solomon Islanders had the maximum 
opportunities to learn through doing.264 
Another issue highlighted by the report was that RAMSI TAs did not have a 
common understanding of capacity development.265  The report went on to say 
that often TAs had been hired for their technical skills and not for their 
mentoring/coaching skills; but even if the right skill set was held by the technical 
advisor, often the impact was at the individual level only.266  Concerns were also 
raised by both Solomon Islanders and expatriates about the high turnover of TAs 
and about the short term of assignments, which tended to pressure the TAs to get 
the job done rather than focus on capacity building.267 
A ten year review of RAMSI stated that although the Solomon Islands Parliament 
had endorsed RAMSI, many politicians and public servants remained ambivalent 
about the mission.268  Examples of the ambivalence given were the offence 
caused by expatriates walking uninvited through villages and the large pay 
differentials between Solomon Islanders and expatriates.269 
The review went on to quote the then Prime Minster, Dr Derek Sikua, as referring 
in 2008 to ‘a local perception rightly or wrongly that this Assistance [RAMSI] has 
been at the expense of local ownership and that the partnership has been 
unequal.’270  A civil society activist was also quoted stating that ‘RAMSIs 
withdrawal is timely.  It is time to give back ownership to the people.’271   
Both of these quotes, along with the issues identified above, indicate that the 
RAMSI operation, which was largely a technical assistance operation, was 
focused on ‘getting the job done’ and did not focus on transferring ownership to 
the SIG and its public servants.  Although there were positive outcomes from the 
RAMSI operation, especially around restoring law and order and financial 
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stabilisation,272  the operation was less successful in transferring ownership to the 
SIG and in building sustainable capacity in the SIG. 
 
3.5 Chapter Three – Solomon Islands Background - Summary  
In chapter three I have given a brief background to the Solomons Islands and the 
RAMSI intervention and discussed the large numbers of TAs working in the 
Solomon Islands.  Many of the issues discussed in the RAMSI technical 
assistance reviews were similar to the issues identified in literature discussed in 
Chapter two.  The issues identified in the reviews has also contributed to the 
framing of my research detailed in Chapter four. 
The next section, Chapter four, is concentrated on the research carried out in the 
Solomon Islands, and differs from many other technical assistance projects 
reviews based in the Solomon Islands.  The research uses effectiveness issues 
that have been identified in aid literature and donor reviews as a basis, to assess 
whether ownership is transferring from the donor to the SIG.  Ownership has been 
identified as key to improving technical assistance effectiveness, and therefore it is 
important to use ownership as a lens through which to view technical assistance 
projects. 
The research assesses the transfer of ownership at both the managerial and 
operational level.  If the transfer of ownership to the recipient country is going to be 
‘real’ ownership, it needs to happen at both the managerial and operational level.   
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Chapter Four – Making Ownership Real in the Solomon 
Islands 
Introduction 
As we have seen so far, a substantial portion of worldwide ODA is spent on 
technical assistance projects; but much of the aid literature criticises technical 
assistance for being ineffective.  Many of the issues identified as causing technical 
assistance to be ineffective can be addressed by the transfer of ownership by the 
donor to the recipient country.  It is therefore important to review technical 
assistance projects through the lens of ownership.  
4.1 Research methodology  
The purpose of the research undertaken for this thesis was to assess whether 
ownership of capacity building technical assistance projects in the Solomon 
Islands is shifting from donors to the SIG.  The focus of the research was split into 
two sections.  
The first section focuses on the managerial level of technical assistance projects 
and the findings from interviews with SIG managers and donor representatives.  
The SIG managers included Permanent Secretaries and the City Clerk.  It 
assesses whether ownership of technical assistance projects is shifting from 
donors to the SIG at the managerial level. 
The second section looks to the operational side of technical assistance projects,  
i.e. how the actual technical assistance project is carried out.  It focuses on the 
findings of interviews with SIG counterparts and TAs.  It assesses whether SIG 
counterparts have any ownership and influence over how the TA is carrying out 
the individual and organisational capacity building. 
The Solomon Islands Government has 24 Ministries.273  One elected Member of 
Parliament (MP) is responsible to Parliament for each ministry as the minister for 
that particular portfolio (eg Minister of Health).  A senior public servant is 
appointed as head of the administration of the ministry, and is known as a 
Permanent Secretary (PS). The PS supports the minister and is responsible for 
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implementing the government’s policy and for the effective day-to-day 
management of the ministry.   
The PS is also the ‘accounting officer’ for the ministry and therefore is responsible 
for all of the money that has been allocated to the ministry.  In the Solomon 
Islands money allocated to a ministry is from the government’s central fund and 
may include money provided from donors in the form of ‘budget support’.  The PS 
is the main contact for all initial interactions with external organisations, including 
donor organisations.   
In the Solomon Islands the head of administration of a City Council is called a ‘City 
Clerk’ and the head of administration in a Provincial Government is called a 
‘Provincial Secretary’.  These officials largely have the same function as a PS in 
central government, but they are responsible correspondingly to all Councillors 
and Members of the Provincial Assembly. 
As mentioned previously, many Solomon Island public servants have been 
allocated a donor supplied TA to work alongside them in order to help build their 
capacity and the capacity of the SIG counterpart’s department.  Most SIG 
counterparts are in middle to senior public servant roles and often have a team of 
people to manage.   
My core research method was semi-structured interviews with SIG representatives 
involved in TA projects. I then undertook qualitative analysis of those interviews to 
identify common themes, patterns or discrepancies, and to analyse against the 
key themes identified in the literature.  The majority of interviews carried out for 
this research were undertaken in the Solomon Islands in November 2014.  
Protocol in the Solomon Islands requires all external parties first to seek approval 
from the PS in order to talk with their staff.  Therefore this was the starting point of 
my research.  I also sought consent from donor representatives to interview donor 
supplied TAs.  Interviews were either carried out in English or Solomon Island Pijin 
(and transcribed into English) depending on the interviewees’ preference.  
In total, 19 semi-structured interviews were completed.  For each interview the 
participant signed a consent form.  The interviews undertaken included five PSs 
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and one City Clerk, eight SIG counterparts, four TAs and one donor 
representative.  The research focused more on SIG public servants perceptions 
and views of SIG ownership, rather than that of donors or TAs as SIG public 
servants views are crucial when assessing what ownership SIG has. 
Background information was also obtained by informally talking with others that 
had experience in working in or with technical assistance projects and from my five 
years’ experience working as a TA in the Solomon Islands. 
Most interviews were recorded and transcribed.  They were on average one hour 
long.  The basis for the questions came from issues already identified in the aid 
literature and from donor reviews in the Solomon Islands.  Interviewees in each 
category of role (i.e. PS, donor representative, TA, counterpart) were asked the 
same standard questions and some of those questions were the same across all 
four categories.  This enabled comparisons within similar roles and also 
comparisons of views across the different roles.  In some cases additional 
questions were asked arising from different responses to the standard questions. 
To ensure confidentiality requested by most interviewees, I will refer to PSs and 
the City Clerk as ‘SIG managers’ and to SIG public servants that have worked with 
donor supplied TAs as ‘SIG counterparts’.  To further ensure the confidentiality of 
those interviewed I will refer to the central government ministry and local 
government as the ‘government department’. 
 
4.2 Research Findings: Technical Assistance Projects & Ownership -        
Management Perspective – Summary 
The research into the management of SIG technical assistance projects was 
focused in four main areas, which align with the key aid effectiveness issues 
identified in Chapter 2.  First, it examined whether the ownership principle in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was being adhered to in the Solomon 
Islands.  Secondly, it evaluated whether the need for projects was being identified 
by the SIG rather than by donors.  Thirdly, it assessed whether ownership was 
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being transferred to the SIG in terms of donor funding, and lastly it considered how 
much involvement SIG managers have in the recruitment and performance 
management of TAs. 
The research showed that the amount of ownership the SIG has of its technical 
assistance projects at the senior management level is increasing.  The Paris 
Declaration had helped initiate the SIG NDS, and also the Declaration helped SIG 
managers to understand what rights they had in aid programmes. 
Managers overall felt that they had more ownership around identifying their needs.  
Identification of projects was therefore more demand driven than previously.  
There was an increase in the amount of funding from donors that is being 
channelled through SIG financial systems in the form of budget support, which has 
increased SIG ownership of aid funding.   
Managers felt that they were always involved in the recruitment of TAs, but did not 
always have enough say in final recruitment decisions.  Managers felt they had 
less ownership in the performance management of TAs. 
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4.2.1 Management Perspective – The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
2005         
Findings 
The SIG is a signatory to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005274 and 
the Declaration is an important document in the Solomon Islands.  One public 
servant stated that the Paris Declaration is ‘the crest of the aid co-ordination 
policy, any donor dealing in the Solomon Islands has to accommodate the Paris 
Declaration Principles.’275  She went on to say that the Paris Declaration was a live 
document that was still relevant today.276   
The NDS in the Solomon Islands was initially developed in response to the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005.277  All SIG ministries are required to 
comply with the NDS.278  Donors in the Solomon Islands also adhere to the SIG 
NDS.279  The current Solomon Islands NDS covers the period 2011 to 2020.280  
Currently the NDS and a 2013 NDS Performance Report has been submitted to 
the IMF as an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP).281  A new 
PRSP is due to be submitted by June 2015.282 
The Paris Declaration has also influenced ownership of aid projects in the 
Solomon Islands at the senior management level.  One SIG manager stated that 
because of the Paris Declaration, Solomon Islanders had learnt more about the 
rights of the recipient country and once they had more capacity they were able to 
challenge the donors more.283  She went on to say that since the Paris Declaration 
was adopted it was more likely that the full cost of a project would be shown to the 
SIG managers and, where SIG manages had the capacity, they could now 
                                                          
274http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/countriesterritoriesandorganisationsadheringtotheparisdeclarationan
daaa.htm 
275 Interviewee 6. 
276 Interviewee 6. 
277 Interviewee 6. 
278 Interviewee 6. 
279 Interviewees 6 & 19. 
280 http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-sol-2015-2017-sd.pdf (last accessed 20th 
January 2015). 
281 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1412.pdf (pg 13) (last accessed 11th January 2015). 
282 Ibid, (pg 11) (last accessed 11th January 2015). 
283 Interviewee 1. 
54 
 
demand their priorities: they now had a lot more influence and control in their aid 
projects than ever before.284  
Conclusions 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which prompted preparation of the 
SIG NDS, has assisted in the transfer of ownership to the SIG.  From the 
responses of interviewees it was clear that they considered that donors were 
complying with the Paris Declaration principles and the SIG NDS, which has 
resulted in the SIG having more control of the types of projects that are being 
implemented by donors. 
The Paris Declaration also assisted SIG managers in the Solomon Islands to 
understand what their rights were when engaging with donors, which has helped 
SIG managers to challenge donors.  Projects are now more demand driven, which 
has also had a positive effective on shifting the ownership of aid projects away 
from donor control and towards the SIG. 
 
4.2.2 Management Perspective – Demand versus Supply Led Technical 
Assistance Projects 
Findings 
All interviewed SIG managers whose ministries engaged TA, were involved in 
identifying the need for technical assistance.285  There was one case, however, as 
mentioned earlier, when the SIG manager felt the need for the TA had ended but 
the donor preferred the contract to be extended.286  The requirement for the 
technical advisor in that case was therefore donor led. 
 
Solomon Island Government managers were also involved in setting or reviewing 
the TAs ToR.287  The ToR were often drafted by donors, but given to SIG 
managers for their comments and approval.288  
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As one SIG manager explained, Parliament now demands to know why TAs are 
needed, how much a ministry is receiving for the technical assistance project and 
where the money is spent.289  She went on to say that this was a good internal 
check that the technical assistance is required by the ministry290 and therefore 
increased the amount of SIG demand driven technical assistance projects.   
This has been a big change since the initial 2003 Australian led RAMSI mission 
which brought with it hundreds of TAs.  As mentioned in section 3.3, the 
deployment of so many TAs was largely driven by the Australian Government’s 
requirement for an ‘all or nothing’ intervention package and therefore demand was 
driven by the donor. 
As mentioned in section 3.3, in his previous term as Prime Minister the current 
Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare, 291 often challenged 
the necessity for large numbers of TAs in the Solomon Islands under RAMSI.292  
As Prime Minister again, Sogavare will no doubt continue his scrutiny of the 
number of donor-supplied TAs, which will further ensure that any technical 
assistance projects are driven by demand from the SIG. 
The importance of demand driven technical assistance projects was reiterated by 
a SIG manager who stated that one of the main factors for the success of an aid 
project that he had been part of was that the project did not have its own agenda, 
or its own programme of activity.293  The SIG manager went on to say that 
everything done under the project had to be linked to the ministry’s corporate plan, 
but he had heard of other donor projects focused on activities outside the 
ministry’s corporate plan.294  He also stated ‘From the very beginning I 
emphasised that the ownership was with the ministry and the way to do it was I 
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had to demand that the execution of the project must be aligned to the [ministry’s] 
corporate plan.’295  
Conclusions 
From the research it was clear that aid projects and decisions relating to the need 
for technical assistance are becoming more driven by demand from the SIG than 
in the past.  SIG managers are heavily involved in identifying SIG needs and 
approving TAs ToR.  There are some individual cases where the need for TAs is 
still being driven by the donors, but this is not to the same extent as when the 
RAMSI programme was fully active. 
The more SIG managers decide whether technical assistance projects are needed 
(or not), the more the ownership will shift.  The continued pressure from 
Parliament and SIG managers to ensure technical assistance projects are needed, 
will help ensure the projects continue to be demand driven.   
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4.2.3 Management Perspective – Funding Technical Assistance Projects 
Findings 
Both the New Zealand and Australian aid programmes provide SIG with some 
form of budget support.  The New Zealand Aid Programme (NZAP) has used a 
SWAp approach in its funding of the Solomon Islands Education Programme since 
2004.296  The EU has more recently moved towards this form of funding and has 
recently held workshops for all government ministries regarding their requirements 
around budget support.297  
Budget support in the Solomon Islands does come with conditions.  Some SIG 
managers felt that TAs were always part of the package and they did not have a 
choice around accepting budget support without having a donor supplied TA.298  
Some budget support contained conditions that the TA must authorise payment of 
any of the donor funds299 and therefore the SIG did not have full control over the 
funds.   
Another SIG manager explained that an evaluation was done by donors to assess 
the SIG eligibility for budget support.  Where the donor was not 100% confident 
that the SIG could meet all requirements, the package was offered with a TA, who 
could assist with capacity building and to ensure that the SIG could meet the 
donor’s budget support conditions. 
Since the recent fraudulent use of AUD$1.5 million of Australian Aid money in the 
Solomon Islands Health Sector,300 financial TAs employed by Australian Aid 
across all SIG ministries are required to endorse all expenditure that is linked to 
Australian Aid money.301  There was a general feeling that some financial TAs 
were employed only to ensure the correct use of Australian Aid money and were 
not in fact required for financial capacity building.302  One SIG manager stated that 
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he did not require a financial TA and would have preferred a TA in another 
position, but negotiations with the donor were unsuccessful.303 
One SIG manager expressed concerns regarding budget support in situations 
where the recipient organisation was not ready for full ownership.304  He felt that 
before direct funding was given there should be appropriate structures in place, 
and that TAs should help with setting those structures up.305  The preference 
expressed by the SIG manager was one of ‘partnership’ until the recipient 
government department was totally ready for full ‘ownership’.306 
Frustration was expressed by another SIG manager over access to approved 
donor funding.307  Although he was told it was up to the SIG manager how the 
funds were to be used, on each occasion that the funding was requested it had 
been declined.308  He stated that he had wasted time writing up project proposals 
for funding just to have it rejected.  Exasperated by this process, he asked the 
donor ‘just tell us what you want us to request, just tell us what you want us to tell 
you.’309  To add to the frustration at the end of the financial year, a donor 
representative said to the SIG manager ‘you didn’t use the money that was given 
to you last year.’310  He replied by saying ‘I was a little bit reluctant to request it.’311 
Funding for TAs was not allocated within budget support funding and TAs were 
paid directly by the donor or donors’ managing consultants.  Some international 
consultants who were employed for short term technical assistance, however, 
were paid from budget support funding.312 
Conclusions 
Budget support and SWAp models of funding help shift ownership of projects to 
the recipient country, and this is happening in the Solomon Islands.  Having 
budget support and SWAps in place does not, however, necessarily mean that 
ownership has been fully transferred to the SIG.  As we have seen, in some cases 
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there are conditions in place that restrict the funds being fully utilised by the SIG 
and fully integrated into its procedures.  
Donors have assessed that SIG is not ready to receive full budget support without 
certain conditions.  The recent health sector fraud has not helped to build donor 
confidence.  In one instance funding was approved but not processed as budget 
support was completely controlled by the donor, to the point where the SIG 
manager gave up applying for it.  In all government departments interviewed, the 
SIG had no control over payments to TAs. 
Overall ownership by the SIG in terms of donor funding is increasing, but the 
transfer of ownership is only at the early stages.  With continued use of budget 
support and SWAp funding models, and with fewer conditions (when donor 
confidence is stronger), clearer rules around access to other funding and more 
consideration about how TAs are paid, the SIG is likely to gain more ownership 
over donor funding.   
 
4.2.4 Management Perspective – Recruitment and Performance Management 
of Technical Advisors 
Findings 
Except in the case of one donor, SIG managers were heavily involved in the 
recruitment process of TAs and were always on the selection panel.  Two SIG 
managers from different government departments, referring to the same donor 
organisation, stated that when the panel did not agree on the best candidate then 
the donor organisation gave the SIG manager the final say.313  One of the SIG 
managers went on to say when the panel does not agree on a candidate ‘they 
[donor representatives] give it to me to make the decision, it’s because I will be 
responsible on the ground to keep the peace.’314   
The same SIG manager, although feeling he had a lot of control in the recruitment 
process, also stated that he was not involved in agreeing the final contracts of 
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TAs.315  He did see the draft contracts but not the final ones, and he believed that 
he should have access to them.316  As TAs were paid directly by the donor and not 
through the SIG financial system, he did not know the full cost of TAs working in 
his government department.317   
He went on to say that any TAs recruited with this particular donor were found on 
the international market and he did not feel like they had to be recruited from the 
donor’s country.318  This donor did not seek to tie aid when recruiting TAs. 
Another SIG manager, referring to a different donor, felt that although he was 
included in the interview panel the panel had more people representing the donor 
than the SIG.  The panel normally had 2 donor representatives and 1 SIG 
representative. The SIG manager stated that he ‘can be used as a ‘puppet’ just to 
show they [the donor] have some SIG representation on the panel.’319   
He went on to say that they get Curriculum Vitaes (CVs) from many different 
countries, PNG, Samoa, Fiji, Australia, New Zealand and Canada and that he 
could tell from the applicants’ CVs, the way they spoke and their understanding 
about the Solomon Islands who would be the right person for the TA role.320  He 
stated, however, ‘when it’s one against two, the two will always win’ and therefore 
had felt he had very little say in who was finally recruited. 
The SIG manager also stated that usually the TA that was selected by the donor 
was from the donor organisation’s own country,321 although this was not a 
requirement and therefore there was some unofficial tying of aid to the donor’s 
country. 
In the case of a third donor organisation, two public servants from different 
government departments stated that SIG management had no say at all in which 
TAs were recruited and how the project was carried out.322  One SIG manager did 
state that although he did not have any say in who was recruited or how the 
project was carried out, he was given all the details of expenditure and felt that 
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that particular donor had been very transparent.323  He felt, however, that he had 
very little control or ownership of that donor ’s projects.324   
Another public servant discussing this same donor stated that the donor always 
contracted TAs and contractors from its own country and therefore most of the aid 
money went back to the donor’s country.325  He believed that the SIG had little 
control of this process and what was done did not always produce the best 
outcomes for the Solomon Islands.326 
Technology has played its part in improving the level of SIG ownership and control 
in relation to recruiting TAs.  One SIG manager said that the internet had allowed 
them to search on the candidate to find out more information themselves.327  
Another SIG manager stated that she had had issues in the past with recruiting 
TAs that could not speak English, even when it was stated they could on their 
CVs.  Today they carried out all interviews by telephone, which addressed that 
problem.328 
Some SIG managers were involved in evaluating the performance of their TAs and 
signed off TAs performance reviews329  One SIG manager stated he was involved 
in an informal process of performance review,330 and another stated he had no 
involvement in TAs’ performance reviews at all.331   
One of the SIG managers stated that they had come a long way with their current 
donor project, but he felt that the evaluation of TA performance assessments was 
one area that could be improved.332  Most SIG managers felt that when they were 
not happy with the performance of a TA, donors would listen to their concerns.333  
One public servant, however, felt that if you were not happy with the performance 
of a TA you were stuck with him or her, as you wouldn’t complain to the donor 
because you would not want to upset the donor.334 
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Another SIG manager noted that one donor had formally started to include SIG 
counterparts feedback on their TAs’ performance (as well as feedback from SIG 
managers), for the performance management process for their TAs.335 
Conclusions 
As we can see from the findings in this section, there are varying levels of 
involvement of SIG managers in the recruitment and management of TAs, and 
therefore varying levels of ownership of this aspect of technical assistance 
projects.  The variation was largely related to the differing practices of each donor. 
This would suggest that some donors were transferring ownership to the SIG more 
than others.  The results, however, showed that donor organisations that gave 
more ownership to the SIG in the TA recruitment process did not give as much 
ownership in the TA performance management process and vice versa.  This 
suggests some inconsistency in how donor organisations view the importance of 
transferring ownership to the SIG in the recruitment and management of TAs. 
Recruiting the most appropriate and effective TA is crucial to the success of the 
technical assistance project.  Overall, more ownership should be given to the SIG 
in both TA recruitment and TA performance management to ensure the best 
choices for the SIG, and ultimately the donor,336 are made.  After all, as stated 
above by a SIG manager, they are the ones that will have to keep the peace on 
the ground, and they are the ones that will be working on a daily basis with the 
TAs. 
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4.2.5 Management Perspective –Conclusions 
The review of ownership from the management perspective has found that at the 
broader level the SIG is increasing the amount of ownership it has of aid 
programmes and therefore of technical assistance projects.  The 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness has helped enable the SIG to develop its own 
NDS and to ensure SIG managers have a better understanding of their rights while 
dealing with donors. The Paris Declaration and the SIG NDS has enabled the SIG 
to take more ownership of their technical assistance projects. 
Technical assistance projects were more likely to be identified by SIG 
management than in the past, especially since the 2003 RAMSI intervention.  
Identifying the need for TAs was more demand driven by SIG than supply driven 
by donors.  With the involvement of Parliament and SIG managers in this process, 
the transfer of ownership will continue to be strongly driven by the SIG.  
Several donors are now funding the SIG through budget support and SWAp 
arrangements, which increases SIG ownership of the donor programmes.  
Conditions and day-to-day practices, however, restrict the amount of control and 
ownership the SIG managers have over their aid funding.   
Some of these conditions and day-to-day practices have been in response to fraud 
issues and donors not having full confidence in SIG financial systems.  Other 
restrictions are too controlling, especially where the funds are not held with the 
SIG.  Donors need to be clear what funds can be spent on to ensure that SIG 
managers have access and can decide how best to use the funds.  
Further consideration needs to be given to how TAs are paid.  If ownership is to be 
transferred to the SIG in this area, as a starting point all SIG management should 
be made aware of the full cost of their TAs.  To transfer more ownership to the 
SIG, as in the case of the Botswana government,337 donors should also consider 
where possible using budget support models for funding TAs.   
The research showed that there were mixed levels of ownership by the SIG in TA 
recruitment and TA performance management ranging from high levels of SIG 
ownership to none at all.  The more donors consistently transfer ownership to the 
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SIG in both the TA recruitment and TA performance management areas, the more 
appropriate the recruitment will be, and the more effective the engagements will be 
from the SIG perspective.  
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4.3 Research Findings: Technical Assistance Projects & Ownership - 
Operational Perspective - Summary 
The research into the operational aspect of SIG technical assistance projects was 
focused in four main areas. First, it examined issues in the TA/counterpart working 
relationship and how that affected ownership.  Secondly, it reviewed the working 
styles of TAs and the impact different styles can have on TA/counterpart 
relationships.  Thirdly, it reviewed how technical assistance were being 
implemented at the operational level and how that impacted on ownership.  Lastly, 
the research assessed what level of involvement SIG counterparts had in TA 
recruitment and TA performance management. 
The research revealed that there has been less of a shift of SIG ownership at the 
operational level of technical assistance projects, compared to the management 
level.  In many respects the TA has the main control and ownership of the 
technical assistance project on the day-to-day operational level.   
Technical advisors’ ownership and control of the technical assistance projects 
were reflected in their interpersonal relationships with counterparts, the working 
styles of TAs and how TAs implemented the projects.  Solomon Islands 
counterparts had little involvement in either TA recruitment or TAs’ performance 
management. 
 
4.3.1 Operational Perspective – Interpersonal Relationships 
Introduction 
Workplace training research shows that training works best when learners are 
engaged and have some ownership of the training goals and processes and the 
teaching is sensitive to the learners pace and level.338  Change management 
experts state that those bringing in change need to have more than their functional 
skills, they need to feel comfortable in dealing with human emotions.339 
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There was a general consensus among interviewees that one of the most 
important qualities that made a good TA was the ability to build a good relationship 
with the SIG counterpart.   
When the relationship between the TA and counterpart is not good, and in some 
cases completely breaks down, it creates a negative tension and resentment 
between the government department and the donor.  Money is wasted paying for a 
TA who cannot work with the SIG counterpart.  The relationship problems arising 
in this scenario may prevent future technical assistance projects effectively 
working within that government department.   
Ensuring the SIG counterpart has some ownership of the capacity building 
technical assistance project will be hindered if there is not a good relationship 
between the SIG counterpart and their TA.  
Findings 
Most government departments that had hosted donor funded technical assistance 
had experienced relationships between SIG counterparts and TAs that had 
completely broken down, to the point where it was no longer feasible for them to 
work together.  One SIG manager said it was not uncommon to have to dismiss 
TAs.340 
There were examples, however, where the SIG counterparts stated that they had 
experienced respectful TAs who worked well within the Solomon Islands culture 
and work environment and who had helped to build their capacity to do their job.341   
One SIG counterpart said that his TA had always given him choices and different 
options to consider when he put ideas forward, which had helped him to develop in 
his own space.342  A further SIG counterpart had said that her TA had good 
technical skills and was able to transfer the skills to her.343 
There were, however, many examples where SIG counterparts and their 
supervisors had felt the TA had not acted in a respectful manner.  One SIG 
manager stated that their SIG staff had on some occasions not come to work as 
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they did not like the way their TA approached them.344  He did however go on to 
say that sometimes this was legitimate but sometimes it was just an excuse not to 
come to work.345 
Another SIG counterpart stated he found it quite frustrating working with a TA who 
did not have any local or indigenous knowledge of working in the Solomon Islands, 
as she dictated how the project was to be run and never asked for the SIG 
counterpart’s input, even though the SIG counterpart had a wealth of knowledge in 
that area.346  He went on to say that the TA never listened to him and never asked 
what he needed.347 
Another SIG counterpart stated that his TA decided on one piece of work and 
pushed him to complete it, without realising that he had other work to do, which 
was frustrating.348  Another SIG counterpart stated that sometimes TAs had been 
racist.349 
One SIG manager stated that a TA who had a poor relationship with her SIG 
counterpart had repeatedly pushed him to get the SIG counterpart sacked.350  The 
SIG manager felt that this was inappropriate for a TA and not the way it worked in 
the Solomon Islands.351   
Another SIG manager stated that sometimes TAs were of the view that their 
recommendations should always be implemented and became angry when they 
were not.352  The SIG manager went on to state of TAs, ‘your responsibility is to 
give me options.  You don’t give me decisions, you give me options.  I make the 
decisions, whether you like it or not, I make the decisions.’353 
Another SIG counterpart with over 10 years’ experience of working with TAs in the 
Solomon Islands stated that earlier advisors who came in soon after the ‘ethnic 
tensions’ were ‘helping us to put things in place, they were “pulling us up”, but they 
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were replaced by advisors that were very bossy.’354  She went on to say that often 
when TAs left the Solomon Islands people just went back to their old systems.’355  
This SIG counterpart was the only counterpart who was interviewed who felt she 
had ownership of the technical assistance project.356  She stated that she had to 
make it very clear to the TA that she (the SIG counterpart) was the leader and the 
supervisor of the TA.357 
One SIG manager stated that TAs can sometimes be seen as a threat, in the 
sense that they can take away responsibility and authority from the SIG 
counterpart and may reduce the counterpart’s chance of getting a promotion.358  
He went on to say that some TAs used tactics to extend their contracts as they 
could earn more money and be treated with more status while working in the 
Solomon Islands than in their own countries.359 
One SIG manager stated that ‘a trap for TAs, is when the TA comes in and 
assumes they know how to build the capacity when in fact they don’t know the 
meaning of capacity, it’s a disaster, especially when the TA has no administrative 
skills or people management skills, that then becomes a difficulty and challenge in 
itself.’360   
There was a general feeling that with the sustained presence of so many TAs over 
ten years, coupled with the many issues with interpersonal relationships between 
SIG counterparts and their TAs, there was some technical assistance ‘fatigue’ in 
the Solomon Islands.   
Of the SIG counterparts interviewed, only one of the respondents said that TAs 
were his preferred choice to build his capacity. 361  Most respondents preferred 
overseas and in-country short term courses, work attachments in other 
governments’ corresponding ministries, and formal university education.  There 
were a few respondents who said some TAs would be good, but there was a 
strong preference for more regional or local TAs who would not be so costly and 
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who would have a good understanding of the local culture, work environment and 
issues.362  
Interpersonal relationships are key in any capacity building technical assistance 
relationship. As one TA stated when asked what qualities make a good TA, 
‘people engagement, being able to talk to people at an operational level.’363  He 
went on to say that ‘many TAs are great at talking at the management level, but 
they need to come down the ladder, they need to come down a few rungs and talk 
to the people that make a difference at the operational level.’364  He believed the 
reason for this was that many TA’s were ‘good policy people but not necessarily 
good people people.’365 
 
Conclusions 
In the same technical assistance project, with the same government department 
and donor, the outcomes of the project could be very different depending on the 
individual TA.  If an effective TA is replaced by an ineffective or inappropriate TA, 
the outcomes of the project change with the change of advisor.  The level of 
ownership the SIG counterpart has also changes depending on the individual TA.  
Unfortunately there were many examples where the SIG counterpart had felt his or 
her TA had been rude, racist and bossy.  Solomon Islands Government 
counterparts often felt TAs had put their own agenda before the counterpart’s, and 
that counterparts had little say or control on how the capacity building was being 
carried out.  The responses were not all negative, but the negative responses 
were strongly felt. 
The cause of breakdowns in these relationships can be attributed to both the SIG 
counterpart and the technical advisor.  Solomon Islands Government managers 
need to ensure the most appropriate366 SIG public servant is selected to be a 
counterpart.   It is, however, the responsibility of TAs, as the professionals 
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employed to work within a development context, to use their technical expertise 
and relationship building skills to do all they can to develop respectful and trusting 
relationships, that allow for the capacity building of their SIG counterparts. 
As mentioned in section 2.3 and in the RAMSI review of technical assistance in 
section 3.4, it is a common problem that TAs are selected for their technical skills 
and not for interpersonal relationship and capacity building skills.  When a TA does 
not have the right skill set the results can be quite damaging and can hinder future 
attempts to build capacity.  This continues to be an issue in the Solomon Islands 
today.   
Although in the research there were many examples of good relationships with 
TAs, there were many more examples of difficult or destructive relationships.  It 
may be that difficult experiences stay with people more than average or good 
experiences do. When interviewees shared good experiences of working with TAs, 
confidence had been built and it was clear that the SIG counterpart had felt more 
empowered. 
It is, however, also clear from this research that the breakdown of interpersonal 
relationships is hindering the ability of many TAs to build the capacity of their SIG 
counterparts and their government departments, and to ensure that SIG 
counterparts have the confidence to take ownership of their own development and 
that of their government departments. 
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4.3.2 Operational Perspective – Working Styles and ‘Pushing’ 
Introduction 
The basics required in any change management process are openness, 
communication, involvement and empowerment.367  Workplace training research 
shows that training works best when it fits in with the desired workplace culture.368 
Technical advisors are involved in both change management and training. 
As with interpersonal relationships, the TA’s working style can affect the level of 
ownership that SIG counterparts have in the process of building their capacity and 
the capacity of their organisation.  
As we have seen, interpersonal skills are crucial for building the strong 
relationships required in technical assistance projects that transfer skills, build 
confidence and empower SIG counterparts to take ownership.  The working style 
of the TA is linked to the interpersonal relationship, but moves away from the 
personal and looks more to how the TA operates in a work environment. 
Findings 
In many cases TAs saw the SIG manager as their boss for operational issues.369  
One SIG manager stated that a TA would report on day-to-day issues to the SIG 
manager and also to the donor.370  This was a positive change, as in the past TAs 
did not report to the SIG manager.371  This shows that ownership is shifting 
towards the SIG. 
While working in SIG departments, most TAs interviewed spoke in English, 
although some understood Pijin.  As mentioned in section 3.1, English is the 
official language that is used in government but on a day-to-day basis many 
Solomon Islanders prefer to use Pijin.   
One SIG counterpart stated that English was good to use at a senior level, but 
when consultation was required in the villages it was advantageous for TAs to 
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speak in Pijin.372  In my own experience of conducting these interviews and 
building capacity as a TA, people generally felt more comfortable speaking in Pijin 
or a mixture of English and Pijin.  Being able to use both languages facilitated the 
interview and learning processes. 
In the Solomon Islands people generally take an indirect approach in their working 
style, avoiding confrontation and being respectful of hierarchy.  Often in a western 
working style a more direct approach is taken, confrontation is encouraged to a 
point where people can challenge each other, and everyone is treated reasonably 
equally regardless of their seniority. For example, management often reiterate that 
‘everyone’s ideas are valuable.’ 
When a TA uses a direct working style in the Solomon Islands, the results are 
usually quite negative.  One phrase that was often used by SIG counterparts to 
describe how their TA worked with them was ‘they push’.  A SIG manager stated 
that often TAs would push and push their counterparts wanting to get things done, 
‘but in the Solomons, Islanders don’t want to be pushed all the time.  The stronger 
you are pushed, the more likely you will do the exact opposite, and you will just 
lock the door.’373 
He went on to say that sometimes he reminds TAs who are working in his 
government department that ‘a softer approach is better’.  When asked why TAs 
took this direct approach, the SIG manager replied that it stems from advisors 
needing to achieve their ToR and that their image is important, in terms of 
perceptions of their success as advisors.  Advisors do not want to be seen as 
incompetent, which they may be when outputs are not achieved.374 
A SIG counterpart also stated that he was often pushed and at times felt as if he 
was against a brick wall, unable to move due to the blockages being outside his 
control.375  He also believed the TA kept pushing, even though he could not do 
anything about the issue, as the TA would be rated on what he had achieved.376  
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Another SIG counterpart also stated that TAs pushed counterparts because they 
had a reputation they wanted to keep and if they didn’t achieve things then it would 
go on their record.377  She went on to say that ‘in the Solomon Islands we need to 
talk to people properly, get people to understand the situation, not telling people 
straight on, pushing it to them, telling them you can’t do this or you can’t do that, 
we do it in a different way here, slowly, slowly, until we reach the goal, not just 
directly.’378  
The SIG counterpart also stated that ‘different processes take time in the Solomon 
Islands, you couldn’t expect something will change the next day, they [TAs] have 
to understand that this is how it works here and you just can’t come here and force 
what you are used to.’379  Another SIG counterpart stated that when TAs take a 
direct approach it is like they are taking over the role of their counterpart.380  
A SIG manager stated that your achievements in building the capacity of your 
counterpart are like you are looking in the mirror.381  Your work should be a 
reflection of your commitment to them.382  He went on to say that when the 
counterpart has done well and is in the limelight, the TA should step aside and 
know that it is a reflection of his or her work, but many TAs do not do that: they 
want to stand in the limelight too.383 
Some SIG counterparts felt TAs were too closed in the way that they worked.  One 
SIG counterpart stated that his TA would keep her work to herself, then when she 
was finished she would give the SIG counterparts the reports to review.384  He 
went on to say that in the Solomon Islands people worked together, that they 
would sit down and discuss and compromise before they sent out reports for 
comments and for final draft: it was more of a team effort.385 
A SIG manager stated that sometimes the SIG counterpart can feel frightened of 
the TA, an outsider. 386  He went on to say that it was important that TAs had an 
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open door policy, and that TAs mixed around and got to know the Solomon Islands 
staff and not just stick to themselves.387  One SIG counterpart stated that when 
she worked with a previous TA who had an open working style, it was very easy to 
approach him, and that she felt comfortable with going to the advisor on any 
issue.388 
Along with the issue of SIG counterparts not feeling comfortable with TAs who 
come from outside of the Solomon Islands, TAs are often treated as someone very 
senior by SIG counterparts.  Some SIG counterparts said that it was difficult for 
them, because of their culture, to question TAs or tell them they are wrong, 
because of their seniority, even when the SIG counterpart knew that what they 
were advising would not work in the Solomon Islands.389   
This issue, if not realised by the TA, can affect the amount of counterpart ‘buy-in’ 
or ownership of changes that are made by the TA.  For example, if a TA drafts a 
policy and gives it to the SIG counterpart to review, the SIG counterpart may not 
feel comfortable telling the TA that he or she thinks it is wrong.  The TA may think 
that consultation has been done and the SIG counterpart is happy with the 
changes, when in fact the SIG counterpart is not. 
One SIG manager stated that he encouraged his staff to challenge him if they did 
not agree with what he way saying, but because of his seniority, staff would not 
usually challenge him.390  This issue was exacerbated for TAs who were not from 
the Solomon Islands.391  It wasn’t until the TA left that his staff would voice their 
complaints.392  The SIG manager went on to say that this was more common in 
Melanesian culture than in Polynesian culture.393 
Another issue that was highlighted by interviewees was TAs failure to respect 
confidentiality.  One SIG counterpart had felt that information that had been shared 
within the government department had been used by the TA on other projects he 
had been working on, which had caused a loss of trust and respect.394    
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Three interviewees also stated that they had experiences of TAs criticising their 
government department externally.395  They had all felt this was an inappropriate 
way for the TAs to act.  One SIG manager stated that the TA should not be 
criticising the government as they are working for the government and therefore 
‘should not be outspoken like that’.396 
Another issue around working styles was that some TAs did not follow SIG 
protocols.  One SIG counterpart stated that some TAs did not follow SIG protocols 
especially around setting up meetings.397  He stated that meetings between 
ministries should always be arranged through the Permanent Secretary, but at 
times the TAs were setting up meetings between ministries through other TAs and 
the PS was not aware of the meetings.398 
 
Conclusions 
The working style of the individual TA greatly influences the transfer of ownership 
and ultimately the success of the technical assistance project.  Technical Advisors 
who adopted an indirect and open working style, similar to the Solomon Islands 
style of working, were accepted and appreciated by SIG counterparts, as were 
TAs who respected the SIG hierarchy and worked within the government 
department’s management structure.  In these cases the SIG counterparts felt 
more empowered and were more involved in how the TA carried out capacity 
building. 
Many TAs, however, had direct and closed working styles, which had detrimental 
effects on the transfer of ownership and on capacity building of their SIG 
counterparts and SIG government departments.  When a more western, direct 
working style was used and/or the advisor had a more closed working style, SIG 
counterparts often resented the approach and it led to some SIG counterparts 
becoming disengaged from their job, and therefore had a demotivating effect on 
them.  It also meant that SIG counterparts were often dis-empowered. 
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In some cases it appeared that TAs were not aware of different working styles and 
used the same approach as they would in their own countries.  This may have 
been due to their lack of understanding about the Solomon Islands, lack of 
capacity building skills, or both.   
Some TAs did not always follow the correct SIG protocols, some criticised the 
government and did not always respect the confidentiality of information that was 
gained while working in the government department.  These actions led to a loss 
of trust and respect and in some cases had a disempowering impact, in that SIG 
counterparts felt the person who was supposed to be building their capacity was in 
fact acting in ways that were detrimental to their government department. 
Overall the research indicates that the TA’s working style can have a huge impact 
on the amount of ownership the SIG counterpart has over their capacity building 
and the capacity building of their government department.  Technical advisors 
working in the Solomon Islands need to adapt their working style to be more 
conducive to the Solomon Islands working style, to ensure their working style 
encourages the SIG counterpart to have more ownership and to take the lead in 
their own capacity building and that of their government departments. 
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4.3.3 Operational Perspective – Implementation of Technical Assistance 
Projects 
Introduction 
As previously mentioned, many aid experts believe that recipient countries should 
be heavily involved in the implementation of technical assistance projects and 
therefore that ownership of the implementation of the technical assistance projects 
should be transferred to the recipient country.  
This section will therefore focus on how much ownership has transferred to the 
SIG in the implementation of their technical assistance project. 
Findings 
Many SIG public servants believed that TAs were implementing ‘blueprints’ from 
their own countries and not working with the SIG to ensure changes were 
appropriate in the SIG context.  One SIG counterpart believed that TAs were not 
trying to bring in ‘blueprints’ of their own countries’ policy and procedures into their 
government department, but she believed that it happened in other government 
departments.399  
Another SIG counterpart stated that often systems that were brought in from the 
TA’s home country were too complex and fell over after the TA had left.400  
Another SIG counterpart stated ‘They [TAs] are here to give advice, not here to 
impose their values on our plans that we try and put in place.’401 
One SIG manager said that sometimes TAs tried to bring in their own countries’ 
systems, but she had stood her ground to ensure that what the TA was doing was 
useful for the Solomon Islands.402 
There were some issues of inconsistency of advice between successive TAs.  One 
SIG manager stated that sometimes a TA would say the previous TA was wrong 
and that the work had to be done in a different way.403  He stated ‘we end up 
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reversing back, turning back, and reversing back.’404  The frustration caused by 
the differing views had led some of the agencies under that government 
department to refuse to have any further technical assistance.405 
As mentioned in sections 2.3 and in the RAMSI review discussed in section 3.4, 
TAs can often end up doing more of the inline work rather than capacity building to 
ensure that they meet the requirements of their ToR.  Although most TAs have 
ToR that state their main objective is capacity building, TAs often find it 
challenging to balance their capacity building role with actually getting the work 
done.  One TA stated that although they should be focused 100% on capacity 
building it was more like 60% technical and 40% capacity building.406  One SIG 
counterpart stated that when TAs were here it was all about getting the job done, 
rather than capacity building.407 
One SIG manager stated that for TAs ‘there is always the temptation when you 
know everything and you know your counterpart is slow to grasp what you want 
them to do, just to do it yourself.’408  He went on to say that he always has to 
remind TAs that they are here to build capacity.409 
One TA stated that there was always a constant battle going on in your head 
between that careful balance of building capacity and doing it yourself.410  Most 
TAs find it difficult to miss a deadline and will usually undertake work, if the 
counterpart is unable, to ensure the job is completed on time.  In some cases this 
is expected by both the SIG and donor and therefore, as mentioned above, there 
is a careful balance between capacity building and doing the job that needs to take 
place. 
One SIG counterpart expressed concerns over consultants being paid to do 
specific work rather than it being completed by SIG counterparts and their TAs.  
When asked why he thought this was done, he replied ‘There was a lot of money 
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with the project and they [the donor’s project manager] had to spend the 
money’.411   
Solomon Island Government counterparts who had TAs that worked part time and 
therefore were not in the country full time, stated that they had no control over 
when the TA would be in-country.412  If the SIG counterparts had particular issues 
they needed help with, they didn’t feel they were able to ask the TA to be available 
in-country for them.  One SIG counterpart stated ‘when I need them they are not 
here and when I don’t need them they are here.’413  
Another SIG counterpart stated that the communication between herself and her 
TA was not good and she never knew when the TA was coming or for how long, 
which made planning very difficult.414  Largely the SIG counterparts concerned did 
not have an issue with the TA being part-time. They stated that TAs who 
communicated well and who could be contacted when they were not in-country 
worked well: it was when the SIG counterpart had no idea when the TA was 
coming that caused the problems. 
There was frustration expressed about the amount of time it took to teach TAs 
about Solomon Island systems.  This was compounded when there was a series 
of short term advisors.415  One SIG manager stated that having to keep training 
successive TAs about the way that processes and systems worked in the Solomon 
Islands was de-capacitating for SIG counterparts.416   
The majority of SIG counterparts considered that they did not have much say in 
how the technical assistance project was being carried out by the TA.  One SIG 
counterpart stated that they were not dictating the terms and they had little 
control.417  Another SIG counterpart stated that ‘it’s just done to you, and not just 
you but the whole government department.’418   
Conclusions 
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When a TA tries to implement a ‘blueprint’ of his or her own country’s systems or 
processes into another country with little thought to the local context, it can be very 
ineffective.  Apart from the process simply not working, it also usually means 
counterparts feel little ‘ownership’ of that new process or system. In this research 
many SIG counterparts felt that TAs were imposing ‘blueprints’ of home country 
systems that were not appropriate to the SIG context. 
There were some real issues with in-consistency between successive TAs which 
had led to a lot of frustration, even to the point where some agencies were 
refusing to take on TAs.  In some cases, this lack of consistency in advice meant 
that SIG counterparts became disengaged with the processes and felt 
disempowered.  This led to reduced feelings of ownership around both the 
technical assistance project and the SIG counterpart’s role. 
As mentioned in section 2.3, the rewards for many TAs are focused on meeting 
output targets and not on achieving long-term sustainable development.  Outputs 
are considerably easier to measure than outcomes.  For example, it is easier to 
measure whether a corporate plan has been completed than whether capacity of 
the counterpart has been built, but achieving outputs does not necessarily mean 
that capacity has been built.  
How the ToR have been set up, often by the donor organisation, can influence 
how the TA implements the technical assistance project.  If the TA is going to be 
measured against the outputs that have been achieved and not on the capacity 
that has been built, then ultimately the TA will become more driven to achieve 
outputs.  The focus on ‘getting the job done’ rather than capacity building has had 
a disempowering effect on some SIG counterparts.  As with other research, this 
research found that TAs in the Solomon Islands also struggled with the right 
balance of capacity building and getting the job done.     
Solomon Islands Government counterparts often felt disempowered when 
consultants were brought in to do the work of the SIG counterpart, especially when 
the SIG counterpart did not work closely with the consultant.  Often consultants 
are brought in for specific types of work, particularly when the job needs to be 
done quickly, but if not handled properly using consultants can cause the SIG 
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counterparts to be left out and have little control over matters for which they are 
responsible. 
Part time TAs can have the added benefit that SIG counterparts do not get too 
reliant on their TA, but it is dis-empowering if the SIG counterpart has no say over 
the times when TAs are in the country.  From an ownership point of view, the ideal 
situation would be the SIG counterpart being able to dictate when the TA would be 
in-country.  This may not always be practical, but SIG counterparts should at least 
have some say as to when they require the TA to be in-country.    
Overall, the research indicates that the implementation of technical assistance 
projects are largely controlled by TAs.  Some more experienced SIG counterparts 
and SIG managers were able to have more influence over how TAs implemented 
their work, but most SIG counterparts felt that the project was being done to them 
rather than with them.  They therefore felt little ownership in implementation of 
their technical assistance project. 
 
4.3.4 Operational Perspective – Recruitment & Performance Management of 
Technical Advisors 
Introduction 
This research has shown the importance of ensuring the right individual TA is selected to 
work with each SIG counterpart.  It is important that the TA is able to build strong 
interpersonal relationships, has a working style that is appropriate in the Solomon Islands 
context and can implement capacity building technical assistance projects in an 
empowering way.   
As discussed earlier, allowing SIG managers ownership of TA recruitment and TA 
performance management is important in selecting the best TA.  It is also important for the 
SIG counterpart, the person the TA will work with most closely, to have some ownership 
of the process.  For this research, it was therefore important to assess whether SIG 
counterparts were involved in the recruitment and performance evaluation of their TAs. 
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Findings 
The research revealed that there was only one instance where a SIG counterpart was on 
the interview panel for recruitment of a TA.419  Generally SIG counterparts had no say in 
who it was that they were going to be working alongside.  Most SIG counterparts indicated 
that they would like to be part of the interview panel or have some say in the recruitment 
of their TA. 
One of the main reasons for SIG counterparts being excluded from the recruitment 
process was that SIG recruiting processes routinely involved only high level SIG public 
servants in the recruitment process.420  Another contributing factor was how the donor 
determined the composition of the interview panel.421  As mentioned earlier, one donor 
allowed only one SIG representative, which would normally be the SIG manager, and 
therefore did not allow a SIG counterpart to be present as well. 
Solomon Islands Government counterparts were not usually involved in any formal 
assessment of TAs performance.  One donor, however, has recently changed its 
procedures so that SIG counterparts will be formally involved in the performance 
management of the TAs.422  A donor representative stated that on some projects SIG 
counterparts were formally involved in the performance management of TAs and on 
others they were not formally involved at all: it did not have a consistent approach across 
all of its projects.423  Other donors did not include SIG counterparts formally or informally 
in the performance management of their TAs. 
 
Conclusions 
Although all interviewees agreed that the relationship between the SIG counterpart and 
the TA was vitally important to the success of any capacity building technical assistance 
project, only one SIG counterpart had ever been involved in the interview panel and 
selection of their TA.   
While in many government recruiting processes only senior staff are involved in the 
recruitment process, recruiting a TA is quite different from recruiting an in-line government 
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employee.  The TA will often be working closely on a day-to-day basis with the SIG 
counterpart for one to two years.  
Ensuring that the SIG counterpart has some say in selecting the TA, ensures that there is 
some ‘buy in’ from the SIG counterpart, and may increase the likelihood that the TA and 
the SIG counterpart are compatible working together. 
It is a positive sign that one donor has started to include counterparts in the performance 
reviews of TAs.  Having counterparts involved in the formal performance reviews of TAs 
may influence how TAs work with their SIG counterparts.   
If the SIG counterpart has more involvement in the TA recruitment and performance 
management processes, it may address the issue of power imbalance between the two.  
Technical advisors may see the SIG counterpart as more of a colleague, or an equal, and 
be more responsive to SIG counterparts’ needs. 
Overall, more ownership of TA recruitment and TA performance management needs to 
shift to SIG counterparts to improve the compatibility of TA and SIG counterparts and the 
overall success of capacity building technical assistance projects. 
 
4.3.5 Operational Perspective – Conclusions 
Ownership of projects by the SIG decreases as we move away from the management 
level towards the operational level.  Although there are signs of some ownership shifting 
from the TA to the SIG counterpart, in general the TAs have most of the control over how 
capacity building technical assistance projects are carried out.  Interpersonal relationships 
and the working style of individual TAs are crucial to the success of the project and to the 
level of ownership that is given to SIG counterparts. 
Technical Advisors who have an open and non-direct working style, and can work within 
the Solomon Islands context, can have very successful relationships.  If a TA has an 
appropriate working style, it can help foster SIG ownership of changes that the TA wants 
to implement, and help empower SIG counterparts to take the lead in their capacity 
building process. 
When TAs do not build good working relationships with their SIG counterparts or when a 
TA does not work within the SIG working style, invariably the SIG counterpart/TA 
relationship breaks down or becomes ineffective.  According to interviewees there had 
been a mix of successes and failures, but when relationships had broken down there had 
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been lasting detrimental effects, and in some cases the SIG counterpart had ended up 
being dis-empowered and ownership of their SIG role had decreased. 
The research found that SIG counterparts were generally not involved in how the 
implementation of their capacity building or the capacity building of their government 
department was carried out.  The implementation was largely controlled by the TA.  Many 
SIG counterparts felt left out of the implementation process and with little ownership felt 
that the project was being done to them rather than with them. 
There are some positive signs that more ownership is shifting to SIG counterparts in terms 
of assessing the performance of TA, but SIG counterparts have little control or ownership 
over the recruitment of their TA.  Giving SIG counterparts more say in who they are 
working with could help improve the compatibility of TA/counterpart relationships and the 
success of capacity building technical assistance projects.   
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4.4 Chapter Four - Making Ownership Real in the Solomon Islands – 
Summary 
The research in this chapter has focused on assessing whether ownership is 
shifting from donors to the SIG, at both the managerial and operational levels.  
The research entailed interviewing SIG managers, donor representatives, TAs and 
SIG counterparts.  Interviewee standard questions were based on technical 
assistance issues identified in aid literature and donor reviews of projects in the 
Solomon Islands.   
In reading the research conclusions, it is important to consider that as the research 
is based on interviewing people, there is a methodological issue that the research 
is reporting on peoples’ perceptions.  The research also has no comparative study 
to assess the results by.   
This research is not suggesting that increasing recipient country ownership is the 
only way to improve the effectiveness of technical assistance projects, but it is one 
approach that is strongly identified as important in the aid effectiveness literature 
(as reviewed in Chapter 2).  Unlike many reviews of technical assistance projects 
in the Solomon Islands, which focus on what is working and what is not, this 
research takes a different angle.  It uses issues identified in aid literature and 
donor reviews as a basis to assess whether the SIG is obtaining more ownership 
in its technical assistance projects. 
The results of the research indicate that the SIG has more ownership of technical 
assistance projects at the management level than at the operational level.  SIG 
managers have more ownership in technical assistance projects than SIG 
counterparts do. 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness has been instrumental in both the SIG 
developing its own NDS and in SIG managers understanding their rights as a 
donor recipient.  The higher the level of experience and confidence of SIG 
managers in dealing with donors and in managing their government departments, 
the more they are able to demand what they need in their technical assistance 
projects, and therefore the more ownership they have.  Technical assistance 
projects are now largely demand driven by the SIG, compared to the past when 
provision of large numbers of RAMSI TAs was supply driven by the donor. 
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The research found that although more donors are using funding models that 
promote recipient country ownership, such as budget support and SWAps, there 
are many conditions in place that restricted full ownership.  In some cases this was 
justified due to corruption issues.  Some donors’ restrictions on other forms of 
funding are unnecessarily impeding the funds being used.   
Solomon Island Government ownership of technical assistance projects could be 
increased if SIG managers were given the details of the full cost of TAs and, 
where there are no major financial management issues, TAs were funded through 
budget support type models.  The main reason why donors do not transfer more 
ownership in their aid funding to the SIG is related to corruption and poor financial 
management processes.  Solomon Islands Government ownership in aid funding 
should continue to be transferred to the SIG, but at a rate that is in-line with 
improvements to financial management issues.  It could therefore take time. 
Most SIG managers felt they had involvement in the TA recruitment process, 
except in the case of one donor, however they did not always have complete 
ownership over the process.  If donors allowed SIG managers to make the final TA 
recruitment decisions, it would help reduce the amount of inappropriate TAs that 
are selected.   
Technical advisors generally reported to SIG managers on operational issues, and 
to their recruiting donor on all other issues.  The amount of SIG manager 
ownership in the TA performance management process is relatively low.  If SIG 
managers played a key part in the TAs performance management, it may 
influence how TAs approach their roles and also help technical assistance project 
outcomes to be more in line with the needs of SIG managers. 
As with other research, it is recommended that donors in the Solomon Islands give 
more ownership to SIG managers in the TA recruitment and TA performance 
management processes.  The transfer of ownership in this area should have few 
barriers in the SIG and therefore willing donors should be able to transfer 
ownership in TA recruitment and TA performance management processes quite 
easily. 
The majority of SIG counterparts had very little ownership of the technical 
assistance projects they were involved in.  Many SIG counterparts felt that their 
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capacity building technical assistance project was being done to them, rather than 
with them. 
There were some exceptions: where TAs had built strong relationships with 
counterparts and were able to give counterparts space to make decisions and take 
control; or where the SIG counterparts had years of experience both in their 
technical field and with working with TAs.  Some TAs had a good working 
relationship with their SIG counterparts, but still had most of the control at the 
operational level of the technical assistance project. 
Many of the impediments to the transfer of ownership to the SIG counterparts 
were at the individual TA level.  Capacity building technical assistance projects 
usually involve two individuals working closely together.  Major issues arose when 
the TA lacked relationship and capacity building skills and had little understanding 
of the Solomon Islands indirect working style and environment.   
As other research has shown, many TAs are selected for their technical ability and 
not for their capacity building skills.  Selection of TAs in the Solomon Islands is no 
exception.  Although people management skills might be seen as part of capacity 
building skills, it is important to consider them separately.  If TAs are expected to 
bring about change, and work closely on a daily basis with a counterpart, they 
need to have excellent people management skills.  Obviously the technical skills of 
TAs are also important, but TAs will not be able to use their technical skills 
productively if they have not created a respectful, trusting and open relationship 
with their SIG counterparts.  If TAs do not create good relationship with their 
counterparts, it can leave counterparts feeling demotivated and disempowered.   
Solomon Islands Government counterparts are often middle managers who 
respect hierarchy, and are generally by culture not confrontational.  Technical 
advisors are often seen as high-ranking, so if a TA has not built a good 
relationship with the SIG counterpart, he or she may not be aware that the 
counterpart is not happy with the way the TA is approaching the project, as the 
SIG counterpart is unlikely to express their concerns with the TA.  When this 
situation occurs there is often little sustainable benefit from the TA’s work.  
When the TA/counterpart relationship completely breaks down, it not only affects 
the counterpart but can effect the entire organisation, and hinder any successive 
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TA’s ability to build trusting and open relationships.  The cumulative effect of many 
poor TA/counterpart relationships has taken its toll in the Solomon Islands, with 
many Solomon Islanders feeling some ‘TA fatigue’.   
Many of the examples raised by SIG counterparts were of negative experiences 
with TAs.  The proportions of good and bad experiences recounted may not have 
fairly reflected the actual rate of good and bad technical assistance experiences.  
If so, this is likely indicative of the significance of the effect that bad experiences 
have had on those interviewed.   
Many SIG managers and counterparts had concerns over the large amount of aid 
money that was spent on TAs.  Many SIG public servants felt that there were more 
cost effective ways to build their capacity and the capacity of their government 
department such as: overseas and in-country short term training courses; short 
term work attachments in other governments’ corresponding ministries; and formal 
tertiary education.   
Where SIG public servants thought a TA would be useful, they preferred to have a 
local or regional TA, or a TA that had experience in the Solomon Islands, who 
could understand the working environment and the people of the Solomon Islands 
better. 
Technical Advisors need to have more than excellent technical, capacity building 
and people management skills, they also need to be able to adapt their working 
style to be more in sync with the Solomon Islands indirect and open working style, 
and to understand and comply with the SIG protocols. Donors need to work 
closely with the SIG to ensure that contracting TAs to work with SIG counterparts 
is the best way to build capacity of their public servants and their ministries.   
Solomon Islands Government counterparts usually had little involvement in the 
recruitment and performance management of their TAs.  This was partly due to the 
SIG practice of involving only high level SIG managers in the recruitment 
processes and partly due to some donors restricting the number of SIG officials on 
the interview panel.   
Recruiting a TA is quite different from recruiting a SIG staff member, and therefore 
a different approach should be taken in their recruitment and performance 
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management.  Allowing SIG counterparts some ownership and control over the 
person they will be working with will improve the compatibility of the 
TA/counterpart relationship and increase the commitment of the SIG counterpart 
to the project.   
Allowing the SIG counterpart more input into the TA recruitment and performance 
management processes may also help balance the power relations between the 
two as the TA and counterpart may be seen as standing on a more equal footing.  
Changing the power dynamics of the TA/counterpart relationship may also support 
the SIG counterpart to take the lead in the project. 
The research at the operational level also found that SIG counterparts felt that TAs 
were often driven by the output goals of their ToR, and that focus hindered the 
amount of capacity building the TAs carried out.  As other reviews have indicated, 
this research found that the TAs’ ToRs need to set goals that encourage TAs to 
achieve better capacity building outcomes. 
Donors, and SIG managers that deal with donors, usually have experience in aid 
development issues, and this has helped SIG managers have more ownership at 
the management level.  As mentioned in other research, TAs usually have little 
experience in aid development issues, as their expertise is usually in a different 
field. This has been reflected in relation to the Solomon Islands in this research.  
To ensure there is a better understanding of the importance of key principles such 
as ‘ownership’ in aid development, TAs and SIG counterparts should receive more 
training in aid development principles.   
In summary, this research has found that the SIG has more ownership in its 
technical assistance projects at the managerial level than at the operational level.  
The findings are indicative of the amount of focus donors have had on recipient 
country ownership at the managerial level compared to the operational level. 
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Conclusions 
Since the beginning of modern aid, the importance of recipient country ownership 
has dipped in and out of vogue in aid development discourse.  Since the 1990s, 
recipient country ownership has been seen as a way forward in improving the 
effectiveness of aid delivery and has been reflected in budget support models, 
PRSPs and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.  
Technical assistance projects, which consume 25% of all ODA,424 have been 
heavily criticised in aid literature for being largely ineffective.  Some aid experts go 
as far as saying they have achieved the exact opposite of their core goals of 
capacity building; i.e., that they have prevented the emergence of local capacity. 
As ownership is seen as a key way forward in improving aid effectiveness and as 
technical assistance consumes such a large part of worldwide ODA, assessing 
whether ownership has transferred to the recipient country in technical assistance 
projects is very important.  The SIG has been a large recipient of technical 
assistance and is therefore a useful government to use as a case study in this 
research.  
This research has focused on both the management and the operational side of 
technical assistance projects.  If ownership is not transferred to the recipient 
country at all levels of aid delivery, then it is not being as effective as it could be.   
The research sought the views of SIG managers, donor representatives, TAs and 
SIG counterparts.  The research has found that the SIG has more ownership of its 
technical assistance projects at the management level than at the operational 
level.  To transfer more ownership of aid funding at the managerial level, issues 
around corruption need to be further addressed.  Determining the level of 
preparedness of the SIG before the transfer of more ownership of aid funding 
takes place, should be an open joint process, involving both the SIG and the 
donor, with measurable targets. 
There are some managerial level changes that could be made more immediately 
including: giving SIG managers more control over TA recruitment and TA 
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performance management; and improving TAs ToR to include more capacity 
building goals. 
At the operational level, and especially between TAs and SIG counterparts, there 
was little transfer of ownership to the SIG counterpart.  Many SIG counterparts felt 
that the technical assistance projects were being done to them rather than with 
them.  Impediments to the transfer of ownership at the operational level were 
largely related to poor working relationships between TAs and counterparts and 
were often due to the individual TA’s lack of: capacity building skills, people 
management skills, knowledge of SIG working style and environment, and 
understanding of the importance of recipient country ownership.  
If SIG counterparts could take the lead in their capacity building, and in the 
capacity building of their government department, TAs’ capacity building would 
likely be more effective for the SIG.  It would also have more SIG commitment, 
and therefore will be more likely to be sustainable. 
Often TAs are experts in their own profession, but they are not necessarily experts 
in aid delivery, capacity building or people management.  It is therefore up to 
donors’ to educate TAs about the importance of recipient country ownership when 
implementing technical assistance projects.  
It is important that SIG managers select the most appropriate SIG counterparts to 
work with TAs.  It would be beneficial if SIG counterparts were given more training 
in aid development issues, such as the Paris Declaration, so they could have a 
better understanding about aid principles, such as ownership, and how that 
applies to them.   
Technical assistance work is unique.  Technical advisors work in challenging 
environments, but TAs remuneration often reflects the challenging environments 
and the specialist skills required.  In most cases, a challenging environment should 
not stop the TA transferring ownership to the counterpart.  Donors and SIG 
managers should ensure that TAs have the right capacity building skills, people 
management skills and technical skills, and ensure that deploying a TA is the best 
way to build the capacity of the counterpart and the government department. 
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The majority of SIG counterparts are ready to have more ownership in technical 
assistance projects, so it is up to TAs to ensure their approach and working style 
encourages SIG ownership.  This can be challenging for TAs who have been 
consultants or managers and are used to being leaders, but they need to let the 
SIG counterpart take the lead in SIG capacity building technical assistance 
projects. 
If ownership of technical assistance projects is going to be ‘real’ for the SIG, then 
the large focus of recipient country ownership at the managerial level needs to 
continue, and there needs to be a much stronger focus on SIG ownership at the 
operational level. 
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